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INTRODUCTION
Need for the Study
At this point in the history of American education, much energy and
many millions of dollars have been used in reporting on the tragic conditions
that currently exist in public schools throughout the nation and in developing
extensive recommendations for improving those schools. Some of these studies,
such as the one recently completed by Charles Silberman, * focus upon conditions
in a variety of school systems throughout the nation, while others, e.g.
,
the
Clark Plan^ in Washington, D. C.
,
focus upon the problems of a specific
school system. In spite of these extensive studies and their often lengthy
recommendations for reform, classroom conditions continue to deteriorate,
especially in the major city school systems.
During the past twenty-five years, over ten million dollars have been
'expended on a variety of studies that have focused upon the Public Schools of the
1
Charles Silberman, Crisis in the Classroom: The Remaking of American
Education. (New York: Random House, 1970).
2
Kenneth Clark, A Design for the Attainment of High Academic Achieve-
ment for the Students of the Public Elementary and Junior High Schools in
Washington, D. C. (New York: Metropolitan Applied Research Center, Inc.,
1970 ).
2District of Columbia. Each of these studies has resulted in final reports sub-
mitted to the Board of Education of the District of Columbia and to the school
administration. All of these studies have included specific recommendations
for reform within the public schools, and a number of attempts have been made
to implement ..the various recommended reforms. The Strayer Report3 in 1948
had a budget of $100,000; the 1964 Model School Division Report4 and subsequent
implementation attempts represented an expenditure of over $4 million during
the five-year period of its existence; the Passow Study utilized in excess of
$264,000; the Anacostia Project^ represented an expenditure of over $2 million;
n
and, finally, the Clark Plan (which is still in the process of being implemented)
I
f
represents at this point an investment of at least $250,000.
Although these studies differed in many ways, they seem to have two
majo*r factors in common: (1) They were initiated and developed by experts and
panels outside the public school system; and (2) They represented programs
never successfully implemented. In those instances where there were success-
3George Strayer, The Report of a Survey of the Public Schools of the
District of Columbia (Washington, D. C. : GPO, 1949).
4Board of Education, "Review of Consultants' Proposals for the Model
School Division, Washington Public Schools," November 1964.
^A. Harry Passow, Toward Creating a Model Urban School System:—
A
Study of the Washington, D. C. Public Schools, (New York: Teachers College
-
Columbia University, 1967).
^Mario D. Fantini and Norman W. Nickens, The Anacostia Community
School Project
,
Washington, D. C. , (Washington, D. C. : Washington Public
Schools, 1968).
7 Clark Plan.
3ful modifications, the successes have not been disseminated throughout the
entire system, and in many instances, even those that were temporarily success-
ful modifications have not remained within the school or area where success
originally occurred. There appears to be a wide variety of internal and external
reasons for the ineffectiveness of educational reform in Washington, D. C.
,
and
these failure factors have never been analyzed or documented in a comprehensive
way.
Many major school systems have faced similar difficulties in the actual
implementation of the recommendations for change made by various blue ribbon
O
study committees, and yet very few researchers have actually attempted to
analyze the reason for these implementation failures. This is in part due to the
fact that most researchers do not have access to the necessary information,
since they do not possess sufficient knowledge of the internal operations of major
city school systems. At the same time, those educational leaders within our
major school systems who do have access to the necessary information do not
generally have the time, the interest, or the necessary research skills to
conduct an effective inquiry into the problems associated with the failure of
their efforts to reform.
The typical school administrator today is involved in the day-to-day
operations of his school system and seldom emerges from crises long enough
^Mario D. Fantini, The Reform of Urban Schools (Washington, D. C.
:
National Education Association, 1970), pp, 10-19.
4to take a hard look at what is going on in the schools. Long-range planning and
evaluation of on-going programs (regular and experimental) must be left to
someone else, if they are to be done at all. Despite this administrative pre-
occupation with day-to-day operations, schools have not operated smoothly or
efficiently.
Urban school administrators are struggling with a perplexing and in-
creasingly urgent problem - that of instituting change in school systems in which
matters have become increasingly critical and insoluble. There have been
two major occurrences in our recent history which led to the realization that
change in education was critical to our future national development. The first
was the advent of Sputnik, which brought national attention to the inadequacies
of our science and mathematics programs. One result of this attention was that
m
for the first time, people were involved in developing curriculum who had never
been involved before, and the development of this new curricula was given
major support by the federal government. Supported largely by the National
Science Foundation, a group of research physicists and science teachers designed
a modern physics course and embodied in it a new textbook, a new set of
.
experiments, new examinations, new teachers’ guides, a set of instructional
films, and other new instructional materials. The materials were
tested in the
schools, presented in detail to teachers, and subsequently released
for general
use. This is only one example of the kind of activity generated
by Sputnik and
the subsequent emphasis on the general need for change in
education in all parts
of the country.
5The second major catalyst for change in education (especially in urban
education) was the civil rights movement, which brought national attention to the
miseries of life in the ghetto and the failure of the schools to provide the
educational experience which could help overcome the effects of discrimination
and deprivation. The public schools in our large cities have abundant evidence
that they are failing, and have failed, in educating those children for whom
education is so crucial - the poor and the black. One needs only to look at
the reading achievement test scores for any large city each year to be impressed
by this discouraging downward trend. And because reading has been the basic
tool for learning in nearly all subject areas, students who fail in reading
eventually become across-the-board failures, drifting with apathy, and often
with hostility, through the schools until they are old enough to drop out. In
short, traditional approaches to instruction have typically met with dismal
failure in our urban schools. It has taken a number of years and a considerable
amount of community outrage to begin to convince educators that their approaches
might be inappropriate, if not wrong, and there are still many who are reluctant
to admit this.
If traditional methods of instruction are acknowledged as ineffectual in
the inner city, then, logically, educators should experiment with new approaches
and institute those which are successful in the urban schools without delay.
Such
9
Ibid.
6experimentation has been fostered for a number of years under both governmental
and foundation grants. Late in 1961, a Panel on Educational Research and
Development under the auspices of the President’s Science Advisory Committee
was formed to explore the contribution that research and development could
make to education - including instructional materials, classroom practices,
teacher education, and school management. In its report of March 1964 to the
U. S. Commissioner of Education, the Director of the National Science Founda-
tion, and the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, the
Panel stated:
Educational reform can be sought in many ways.
The technique emphasized by the Panel has two
aspects. The first is the development of models,
of something tangible to show what can be done -
textbooks, films, teachers' guides. . . also the
development of new kinds of schools and new
programs of teacher education. The second aspect
is the voluntary selective adoption of these models
through local decisions by the components, numbering
in the thousands, of the American school system. . .
The very center of the Panel's concern, educational
research and development, is not merely an effort
to get more education for the dollar. It is a reflection
of the belief that our society is evolving. Educational
research and development is a mechanism to help the
educational system adapt rapidly to new conditions.
Reform must be continuous not only because successful
research opens up further possibilities but also because
a changing society means changing demands on the
educational system. 10
•^"Innovation and Experiment in Education: A Progress Report on
Educational Research and Development to the U. S. Commissioner of Education,
the Director of the National Science Foundation, and the Special Assistant to the
President for Science and Technology," March 1964, pp. 4-5.
7Now, almost ten years after the formation of the Panel on Educational Research
and Development, we must observe that reform is not continuous in education.
In fact, when it appears, it usually occurs only in scattered areas within
isolated programs and schools.
The strategies involved in achieving major reform in urban education
have been approached in a number of ways. For example, a seminar in which
this writer participated in February 1966, 11 sponsored jointly by the Center
for Coordinated Education at the University of California, Santa Barbara, and
the U. S. Office of Education, was devoted entirely to the growth of the teacher,
to the nature of the organization or consortium which would create a method for
this growth, and to the character of the agent or -catalyst who, by direct
confrontation with the teacher, would stimulate it. The approach developed by
the seminar was that of using a consortium and a special person acting as a
catalyst to motivate the teacher to examine his methods critically and to engage
in small-scale inquiries of his own choosing.
This focus on the teacher as the key to educational change has remained
as the fundamental aspect of most efforts to reform urban schools. Staff
development programs of every kind have been designed to upgrade teaching
skills. Those educators who were working for reform realize that the creation
1:L
The Professional Growth of the Educator, Center for Coordinated
Education, University of California, Santa Barbara, February 1966, the U. S.
Office of Education.
8of models was of very limited value unless the models could be implemented
to affect large numbers of children. All of the new textbooks, films, and
teachers' guides in the world would have only limited impact on what actually
occurred in the classroom unless the teacher were given new skills to accompany
them. Thus, the ability to change human behavior became, and has remained,
the pivotal point for many of the reform efforts in urban education.
Staff development programs for teachers have been designed for many
aspects of their development including teacher attitudes, teaching skills, and
mastery of the subject areas. Many of these staff development programs have
been carried out and numerous teachers have participated within our large
cities. Nevertheless, these programs have reached a very small proportion of
the teachers, because they are generally voluntary and they have reached
primarily those teachers who are conscientious and eager to improve. As a
result, there remains a large portion of teachers untouched by staff development
programs - and even if these programs were made compulsory, there is
considerable doubt as to whether it is possible to modify the behavior of adults
who strongly resist change.
One important ingredient which has been missing in most staff develop-
ment efforts for teachers has been the involvement of principals, as well as
parents and students, as partners in the training process. The involvement and
support of the school principal is crucial for effecting change, and the students
of today have much to teach us, for it is they who have had the closest look at
9our educational shortcomings.
In the Model School Division of the D. C. Public Schools, the work of
the Innovation Team in staff development has had demonstrable impact on
expectancies, program, and innovative style in classrooms. The Innovation
Team is a group of teachers released from classroom duties in the Model
School Division to help other teachers find ways to improve the education of
inner-city preschool, elementary, and junior high school children. One of the
major strategies of the Team (formed in 1967) was its active involvement in
stimulating other teachers to consider alternative methods in teaching and
instruction and in providing teachers with methodological tools (both skills and
materials) and with enabling attitudes for improving general instruction and the
learning climate.
0
In the process of developing teachers who are highly qualified, it is
important that they be given a new image - that of being skilled in their fields
and, even more importantly, that of being able to have decision-making roles
both in what is being taught and in how it is being taught. However, development
of teachers alone will not bring about the kind of reform we are seeking in
education. In performing such a difficult job, teachers need strong admini-
strative support, and, for the most part, they are not presently receiving such
support. From my viewpoint, staff development at the administrative level is
almost as crucial as that of the teacher.
10
Public school systems have grown very rapidly in recent years, particularly
in large urban areas. This growth has been accompanied by little or no systematic
or long-range planning, and the result has been the evolution of inefficient and
ineffective school management structures. These structures are now faltering
under the increasing strain of public demands on education. The sheer size of
urban school systems today serves to emphasize those inefficiencies which might
previously have gone unnoticed or which might at least have produced less
noticeable ill effects.
A number of factors have contributed to the creation of the management
dilemma now faced by educators. One of the most important is that manage-
ment has been drawn almost exclusively from classroom teachers, who, while
they might have had a great deal of experience and proficiency in that capacity,
typica'lly have had no management experience or training. Thus, a management
hierarchy has been created with a serious lack of exposure to the technical and
methodological aspects of job performance. Once created, this hierarchy has
become self-perpetuating. Another factor which has complicated this problem
is the existence of tenure laws in most places, making it very difficult to
remove ineffective administrators from their jobs. The problem is further
compounded by varying kinds of local government regulations and restrictions
limiting the possibilities for providing financial incentives for improved job
performance.
The result has been that the wheels of school management grind slowly,
11
if at all, especially in those areas where special skills are required, such as
budget development, material procurement and distribution, building design
and maintenance, and curriculum development. Efficient and effective per-
formance in these areas is crucial to providing the essential administrative
support to the classroom teacher in the development of successful educational
programs.
The focus of school management has moved farther and farther from the
primary instructional relationship - that of the pupil and teacher. As the
hierarchy has grown, it has become cumbersome and rigid, and, most important,
it has become isolated from the classroom. In effect, school management does
not serve the very purpose for which it exists - that of providing services
which will facilitate the educational process. Rather, it often seems to exist
in order to complicate the educational process.
The ill effects of this kind of administration have become so visible
today that there is an enraged community in nearly every large city pointing
a well justified finger of guilt at the entire school administration, but especially
at the most visible administrator, the principal. Often community personnel
are fighting for decentralization and community control, which seem to them to
hold the only promise for immediate solution of today's educational problems.
Yet it is evident that decentralization and community control are not panaceas.
Simply dividing up existing structures will not create the changes which are
needed; nor will community involvement be meaningful without an effective
j12
mechanism for orchestrating that involvement.
In the writer’s view, even though it may seem impossible to those who
are trying to make it happen, change is inevitable in our urban school systems.
The evidence of the inevitability of change lies in the unmitigating forces within
the community whose demands for change are unrelenting. It is these forces,
often filled with hostility and militancy, which have placed an important choice
before urban school administrators everywhere; that choice is one of systematic
change through involvement of all of the forces in the community, or change
brought about by conflict and disruption and over which there will be little
control. The proper choice seems all too obvious, and yet, unless we develop
in our school administrators and our teachers the skills to utilize these emerging
forces for constructive change in an open school system, they will become more
defensive and resistant, and conflict will inevitably ensue. Therein lies the
challenge.
The Study
As a major school administrator, the author has had access to and
personal knowledge of these factors (common to all large urban school systems
in varying degrees) and their impact upon the Washington, D. C. , school system.
It is my intent to provide in this study an extensive analysis of the reasons for
the ineffectiveness of attempted educational reforms within the Public Schools
—
—— " —
of the District of Columbia over the past twenty-five years. The study will
13
begin with the Strayer Report, 12 completed in 1948, and continue through the
Clark Plan, 13 still being implemented in 1972. It will be a study making use of
objective data collected from school reports, the records, and newspaper
analyses; however, the cohesion will be brought about by the author's own
personal knowledge and participation in the school system during the period of
these key events. And it is envisaged that this point of view will give the
direction to the study.
Objectives of the Study
The general objectives of this study are to analyze selectively the major
reform efforts that have occurred in the Washington, D. C.
,
school system
over the past twenty-five years. In the process of such an analysis, this study
will provide information helpful to the Public Schools of the District of Columbia
and to other urban school systems which face similar problems and have
entered upon or are considering reform in educational operations.
The specific objectives of the study are:
1. To analyze and document the recommendations for
reform made by the Strayer Commission, 1948 14
2. To analyze and document the recommendations for
12
Strayer Report .
13Clark Plan .
^Strayer Report.
14
reform made by the Model School Division (Cardozo
Area), 1964 15
3. To analyze and document the recommendations for
reform made in the Passow Study, 1967 lG
4. Tc analyze and document the recommendations for
reform designed by the Anacostia Project, 1968 17
and to develop in detail this effort as a case study
typical of reform attempts in the Public Schools of
the District of Columbia
5. To analyze and document the recommendations for
18
reform designed b}r the Clark Plan, 1970,
6. To examine from a historical perspective the origin
of each of these reports and the local and national
forces which influenced each of the five reform
movements
7. To determine the status of, and relation to the system
as a whole of, each of the reform movements as of
1971-1972.
"Model School Division Review. "
16Passow Study .
1 7
Fant ini and Nickens.
18
Clark Plan.
15
In view of the above objectives, the study will focus upon: (1) the
actual recommendations for reform; (2) the extent to which those recommendations
were actually carried out; (3) how those recommendations were compromised
in the process of their implementation; and (4) the significant factors in
compromising the effectiveness of each of the suggested reforms.
Procedures
The information and data for this study will be secured from the author's
personal knowledge of and familiarity with the origin, development, and
operation of four of the five efforts. Except for the Strayer Report, the author
has been directly involved in planning, writing, and administering each of the
reform attempts to be analyzed. These experiences range from working with
a local school community to meeting with representatives of local and national
government and university and professional people from a cross-section of our
country. This is a unique feature of this study and, paradoxically, a strength
and weakness simultaneously.
Another major source of information will be a careful examination ol the
wide range of documents covering each of the five topics. These documents
include minutes of the meetings of and reports to the Board of Education; files
of newspaper clippings from all four of the papers covering the schools;
progress reports made to various organizations from citizen to budget testimony
I
before various federal offices; and interviews with a variety of people involved
with the programs, ranging from past superintendents and Board of Education
16
members to citizens who served as planners, community board members, and
employees in the programs. Finally, where evaluations of any kind were made
these documents will be examined and the findings carefully reviewed and
reported.
Limitations of the Study
This study is confined to the personal knowledge of the author and his
peers who consented to be interviewed or to complete a written report on specific
aspects of one of the reform movements; the files of the Board of Education;
the newspaper files of the Public Schools of the District of Columbia; the various
reports prepared in response to requests from many sources, as well as those
called for in the design of the project; interviews with the citizens who worked
in a variety of ways with each effort; and informal personal observations.
This study is not intended to provide a statistical analysis of specific
quantifiable data and, in addition, will have all of the limitations inherent in
historical research studies which look backward through the glasses of time.
Conversely, this is also a unique strength, since the author has had personal
access to and experience with the programs and people who attempted to carry
out the various recommendations for classroom and system reform. The fact
that the author was personally involved in the design and implementation of four
of the five reform efforts may make the analyses somewhat biased; yet the story
of reform and change (or the lack of it) in school systems is ultimately the human
and personal story which would not be complete without a certain amount of personal
bias.
17
The findings of this study are somewhat limited by the inescapable fact
that pieces and fragments and often reasonably intact components of each of the
reform efforts are still operating in many sections of the Public Schools of the
District of Columbia.
Finally, this study on the Ineffectiveness of Educational Reform is
somewhat limited by the lack of a clear definition of what the school system
expected of reform efforts and the general lack of any provision for the intro-
duction into the entire school system of the successful aspects of specific reform
efforts that were carried out in a part of that school system.
Design of the Study
This study presents an extensive analysis of a variety of studies that
have focused upon efforts at reform in education during the past twenty-five
years in the Public Schools of the District of Columbia, and the recommendations
made by each of these studies. The study makes an effort to analyze these
recommendations and to identify those factors which compromised these efforts
and thereby made them ineffective. Further, this study analyzes the situation
or climate (social, educational, or political) which produced the need and the
will to develop these reform efforts.
The study will consist of five chapters. In Chapter I the need for the
study was determined, based upon a discussion of the need for some analysis of
the ineffectiveness of educational reform in view of the large sums of local and
federal money now being provided to support education in our cities. Despite
18
these efforts, education is still failing in our cities and citizens and officials
are crying for improvements. Additionally, the purpose, objectives, procedures,
and limitations have been set forth in the first chapter. In Chapter II, a number
of relevant issues and background information on the Public Schools of the
District of Columbia, which led to the undertaking of these reform efforts, will
be discussed. Included in Chapter II will be a discussion of the nature of the
reform studies, also examined will be the constraints within and without the
system; the nature of the bureaucracy in which the reform efforts had to
operate; and the difficulties encountered in interpreting and convincing the power
structure (including the Board of Education, the city government, and the Con-
gressional Appropriations Committees for the District of Columbia) of the need
for educational reform.
In Chapter III the writer will discuss in detail The Strayer Survey, The
Model School Division and the Passow Study. The Clark Plan and the Anacostia
Project will be analyzed in Chapter IV. Under consideration are: (1) the actual
recommendations for reform; (2) how the recommendations were compromised
in the process of their implementation; (3) the significant factors in compromising
the effectiveness of each of the suggested reforms. In Chapter V the writer will
summarize his findings and present his conclusions and recommendations.
CHAPTER II
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
Chapter I discussed the fact that during the past twenty-five years over
ten million dollars had been expended on a variety of studies that have focused
upon the Public Schools of the District of Columbia with few major reforms
actually implemented. In order to analyze the failure to implement these reform
recommendations, some picture of the D. C. schools is necessary.
It will be the thesis of the author throughout this chapter that, while
there are differences in size, governance, and ethnic makeup among various
urban school systems, the commonality among their ailments and symptoms
of distress is astonishing. Mario Fantini describes the national education crisis
in these words: "It is not possible to discuss education as a problem peculiar
to some Americans. Urban education is American Education. "*
Unique Character of the District School System
It will be the purpose of the author to focus upon what may appear to be
a paradox: first, that Washington, D. C. , as an urban school system is in many
respects quite unique; and second, that in other respects it has served as a
kind of temperature gauge and pcrcursor of urban crises which are felt through-
1
Fantini, p. G.
20
out the country. Washington, D. C.
,
is unique in that it is the only city governed
by the U. S. Congress through a Presidentially appointed Mayor-Commissioner
and nine-member City Council. This characteristic of government for the
District of Columbia applies to the public school system, which is under the
control of an eleven-member elected Board of Education. Strayer described the
Board of Education this way:
The Board of Education is the highest educational
authority for the school system in the District. In
the formulation of policies, in the development and
improvement of the schools, the Board of Education
has supreme control, subject only to the acts of the
Congress. In this respect, the school system of the
District of Columbia is unique. In every State and,
therefore, in every city of the Nation, a local board
of education operates under the general framework
of a State educational plan. Such a board of education
is also subject to the State education authority. In
the District of Columbia, however, the legislative
* mandate for the "control of the schools" by the Board
of Education comes direct from the Congress.
w
The District Code relating to the government of the District, and more
specifically through those sections known as Title 31, Educational and Cultural
Institutions, defines the authority as follows:
The control of the Public Schools of the District of
Columbia is hereby vested in a Board of Education
to consist of nine members all of whom shall have
been for five years immediately preceding their
appointment bona fide residents of the District of
Columbia and three whom shall be women. The
members of the Board of Education shall be appointed
by the District court judges of the District of Columbia
Strayer, p. 2 .
21
for terms of three years each, and members
shall be eligible for reappointment. The members
shall serve without compensation. Vacancies for
unexpired terms, caused by death, resignation, or
otherwise, shall be filled by the judges of the District
Court of the United States for the District of Columbia.
1 he Board shall appoint a secretary, who shall not be
a member of the Board, and they shall hold stated
meetings at least once a month during the school year
and such additional meetings as they shall from time
to time provide for. All meetings whatsoever of the
Board shall be open to the public, except committee
meetings dealing with the appointment of teachers.
The Board shall determine all questions of general
policy relating to the schools, shall appoint the
executive officers hereinafter provided for, define
their duties and direct expenditures. All expenditures
of public funds for such school purposes shall be made
and accounted for as provided in Section 47-101, under
the direction and control of the commissioners of the
District of Columbia. 3
This describes the responsibility of the Board of Education for the
operation of the schools in 1948, which, for the school year 1947-48, had an
enrollment of 91,489. This figure included both "colored" and "white" school
enrollments. These terms were used by Strayer to describe the dual school
system in operation until the Supreme Court Decision of 1954. In 1948, according
to Strayer’s figures, the "white" school population was 49,877, or 54.5 per cent,
while the "colored" population, 41,612, comprised 45.5 per cent of the total
enrollment.
3
D. C. Code (1948), in Strayer, p. 2.
22
If one looks closely at the operation of the D C. Public Schools and the
Board of Education, one could justifiably conclude that little substantive change
has occurred since 1948. Paradoxically, there have been major changes in the
selection and organization of the Board of Education, but in a later chapter we
shall discuss in further detail how the day-to-day operations in 1972 differ only
slightly from those in 1948.
Yet changes have occurred, as shown in the description of functions of
the Board of Education in the pamphlet "Facts and Figures":^
The general control of the Public Schools of the
District of Columbia is vested in an elected Board
of Education. The Board of Education appoints
the Superintendent of Schools for a term of three
years and an Executive Secretary who shall not be
a member of the Board. It sets policy for the
operation of the public schools, determines the
entire curricula, plans the program of school
construction, and is responsible for textbook ac-
quisition. It approves and sets priorities for the
expenditure of funds.
Under the directive of Public Law 90-292, ^ the
elected eleven member Board of Education holds its
organizational meetings on the fourth Monday of each
January. Members of the Board may receive up to
$1200 annum in compensation. Eight members
represent specific city wards; three represent the
total city on an at-large basis.
The Board of Education holds stated public monthly
meetings during the school year and such additional
meetings as it deems appropriate. The stated
meeting of the Board of Education is traditionally held
4
"Facts and Figures, D. C. Public Schools, 1970-71."
^Reorganization Act, 1967.
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on the third Wednesday of each month at 7:30 p. m.
The Board may hold Lommunity meetings in various
sections of the city for the purpose of hearing persons
who desire to address the Board. Special meetings
may be called by the President when he deems necessary.
The President presides at the meetings of the
Board of Education. He appoints all special committees
and is himself an ex-officio member of those committees.
The major changes in the organization and functions of the Board of
Education as provided for in the Reorganization Act of the District of Columbia,
1967, were these: (1) for the first time since the last half of the 19th century,
the citizens of the District of Columbia could vote for representatives to the
Board of Education; and (2) the new Act provided a Presidentially appointed
Mayor-Commissioner (to replace the former three-commissioner form of local
government) and a nine-member City Council. As in the old form of government,
the Board of Education has no fund-raising authority, and it must present the
school budget to the Mayor-Commissioner and the City Council for review and
approval. In other words, the elected Board in 1972 still faces many problems
identical to those in 1948 - lack of autonomy to raise funds, fix teacher salaries,
or classify jobs; and the requirement to transmit its budget directly to the
Congress for action through the usual federal procedures.
In summary, the budgetary process (including salary requests) now
follows this format: The Superintendent prepares the budget and presents it
to the Board of Education for review and approval, defending and justifying the
requests to the Board members. After approval by the Board of Education, the
budget is submitted to the City Council, which, after holding hearings, can
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reduce or raise any items appearing in the budget. Indeed, the City Council
has on occasion even eliminated entire programs, and although this authority
has been disputed by the Board of Education, to my knowledge, the Council's
authority has been sustained in each case. After the Council completes its
review, it forwards the school budget to the Mayor, who, after a further review,
incorporates the school budget into the complete city budget and forwards the
entire package to the Federal Bureau of the Budget. There, the total budget
for the District of Columbia is reviewed, revised, and forwarded to Congress
for final action. Again the Superintendent and his staff must present and defend
the final budget before the House and Senate Subcommittees on Appropriations
for the District of Columbia. The schedule for this process is roughly from
October to June: The Board of Education is supposed to transmit its budget to
the Mayor by October, and final Congressional action should occur by the end
of the current fiscal year. In fact, however, the District of Columbia budget
has often been approved four to six months into the new fiscal year. This reality
has had a significant and often negative influence on the reform efforts upon which
this paper is focused.
As stated earlier, the total school enrollment in 1947-48 was 91,489,
of which 45.5 per cent was Black. In October 1970, the total enrollment
was
146,224, of which 94. 8 per cent was Black. In other words, in 23
years the
non-white school population had more than doubled.
0 The October 1971 enroll-
ment of the D. C. Public Schools was 143,411, representing
a slight decrease,
®
"Facts and Figures," op. cit.
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and the Black school population represented approximately 95 per cent of the
total.
It has been said many times that the civil rights struggle of the Sixties
did more to highlight the inequities and shortcomings of urban education than
any other single force. This is apparent in the literature of the period, legal
actions brought by individuals and groups against various educational practices,
and the support provided for education through legislation passed by the federal
government. In this arena of citizen unrest and dissatisfaction with education,
Washington had more than its share. From Congressional investigations to law-
suits, the D. C. schools have been buffeted mercilessly for the past several
years. Perhaps the harbinger of things to come began with the Hobson vs.
Hansen case (1967), which outlawed the "track system" in Washington and
demanded plans for increasing pupil and teacher integration; it resulted in
Superintendent Hansen's retirement in July 1967.
The last decision rendered against the schools charged inequalities in
spending, and on May 24, 1971, Judge Skelley Wright, U. S. Circuit Court,
ordered the school system to equalize the per-pupil cost of teachers' salaries
to within five per cent of the city-wide average. The decree applied only to
g
elementary schools and only to the amount the city spends for teachers' salaries.
7
Fantini, op. cit.
,
pp. 9-19.
g
At this writing, February 29, 1972, the Washington Post reported "Hobson
said he will ask Judge Wright to find the school administration in contempt of
court and to turn over the operation of the school system to an outside 'master' who
would bun everything until it's in compliance. ' Julius Hobson, former school
board member, brought the suit resulting in the equal spending ruling by U. S.
Circuit Court Judge J. Skelley Wright. "
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Salaries paid from federal funds were exempt from the decree.
During this climate of crisis, the D. C. schools have had an acting
superintendent twice, an appointed superintendent (later relieved of his duties),
and the incumbent superintendent (appointed in October 1970) since July 1967.
The incumbent superintendent stated, four months after he had assumed office,
that:
The public schools of the District of Columbia have
been the object of intense public concern and scrutiny
over the last several years, local, national and
Congressional. They have also been the subject of a
number of professional and non-professional reports,
some of which have been highly objective and most
thorough, others of questionable merit. These reports
have in common one central theme: the lack of quality
education in the District of Columbia Public Schools.
All such reports have adduced a score of reasons why
most students in our schools are not being adequately
educated, why they are not acquiring the basic skills
in reading and math, and why they drop out of school. 9
An analysis of the reports mentioned in this study (the Strayer Survey,
the Model School Division Review, the Passow Study, the Anacostia Project, and
the Clark Report) supports the superintendent's statement, as each of these
reports have some of the themes mentioned above. However, as we previously
stated, there are other factors which must be considered in any analysis, such
as why the reform effort was initiated; by whom, if known and identifiable; and
the political and social climate in the system and the city at the time.
The Superintendent's 120-Day Report, District of Columbia Public
Schools, Washington
, D, C.
,
February 1971.
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The Straycr Report
Thio leport was ordered by the Congress of the United States under the
following Survey of the Public School System of the District of Columbia (Public
Law 724, Chapter 555):
An act making appropriations for the Government of
the District of Columbia and other activities chargeable
in whole or in part against the revenues of such District
for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1949, and for other
purposes.
Survey of Public Schools
For a complete survey of the public school system of the
District of Columbia with respect to the adequacy of the
present plant and personnel, as well as educational
methods and practices, to serve the District, said survey
to be conducted under the supervision of a person qualified
by training and experience in the field of public school
education to be appointed by the chairman of the sub-
committees on District of Columbia Appropriations of the
respective appropriations committees of the Senate and
the House of Representatives at a salary of $1000 per month
and $300 per month for expenses, $100,000: Provided that
the person so appointed to supervise the said survey is
authorized to employ necessary assistants at rates of pay
to be approved by the chairman of the said committees, and
the said director may request and be entitled to obtain such
clerical assistance as he may deem necessary from agencies
of the District of Columbia: Provided that the said Director
shall make a full report to the aforementioned Chairman
prior to March 1, 1949, setting forth the results of the
survey and his recommendations. 10
Clearly, the Strayer Report occupies a unique place in urban education.
The author knows of no other study of a school system initiated and ordered
10u. s. Congress, House, Survey of the Public School System of the
District of Columbia
,
H. R. 6430, 80th Cong. , 2nd scss. , 1948.
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by Congressional legislation and, in fact, administered by the Congress through
its subcommittees for the District of Columbia. In a later Chapter, III, we
will discuss this significant report in greater detail.
The Model School Division
A very brief look at the Strayer Survey has indicated how the social and
political characteristics of the District of Columbia impinge upon its education
system and ultimately upon the operations of that system. The history of the
Model School Division further emphasizes this unique characteristic of the
District of Columbia.
The planning and organization of the Model School Division involved
representatives from the developing local poverty program, the President's
Science Advisory Committee, representatives of the Ford Foundation, and
representatives of the superintendent's office. An outside consulting team was
also hired to recommend the kind of structure and organization necessary to
accomplish the goals of the Model School Division.* The five consultants were:
J. Bernard Everett - Assistant Superintendent of Schools
Newton, Massachusetts
Roderick F. McP’nee- Assistant Professor of Education
Harvard University
Graduate School of Education
*This area was commonly referred to as the Cardozo District,
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Donald P. Mitchell - Executive Secretary
New England School Development Council
Project Coordinator
David V. Friedman - Professor of Education
Harvard University
Graduate School of Education
Dean K. Whitla - Director of the Office of Tests
Harvard University
The kind of reform envisioned by this team is best expressed by this
excerpt from a preliminary report submitted on September 15, 1964, to the
superintendent and the local poverty agency, The United Planning Organization
This preliminary report proposes an organizational
structure for the model community system in the
Cardozo school district. At that early stage of
development, the structure is all-important, for a
subsystem devoted to innovation and change, as
Cardozo is, requires extra attention to be certain
that the conditions for success are present.
Among the conditions this organization is created
to provide are the following: involvement of all
community agencies (U.P.O.) rather than the
schools alone; sufficient autonomy to provide the
freedom to experiment boldly and without fear of
failure; provisions for adequate financing; a
committment to testing and demonstrations on a
major scale rather than "tinkering"; a realistic
relationship of the Cardozo system to the District
of Columbia school system; and an approach to
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evaluation which can make the knowledge gained
here of value to others. ^
When the Board of Education finally approved the concept of a "model
subsystem" for the District of Columbia schools, all of the above conditions
were incorporated in the final plan in one way or another, with the exception of
a well developed evaluation plan.
It has been stated that ideas which fostered the Model School concept
came from many sources, but one which is subtle and difficult to identify,
since it was a gradual process, must be pinpointed. This was the growing volume
of interest in and implementation of experimental programs and research
projects concerning the sociology, the psychology, and the economics of poverty
which dominated the social and political climate of the mid-sixties.
The reforms stated were to occur in a subsystem comparable in size to
0
many school systems across the country. The central city boundaries of this
subsystem presently contain five pre-schools, sixteen elementary schools, four
junior high schools, one senior high school (Cardozo), and a city-wide vocational
high school. In October 1971, the official total enrollment was 15,12 7 for the
division.
Perhaps the Model School Division has had more influence on the District
of Columbia Public Schools than any of the other reform movements we are
"analyzing. We will look at the impact of its programs on the system and at the
1
^'Preliminary Report, Washington, D. C. , Model School System,
"
September 15, 1964.
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evaluative reports jii Chapter 111 and determine the degree of impact.
The Passow Study
In 1964-6G, the Four Track Curriculum instituted by Superintendent
Carl F. Hansen was coming under increasingly hostile scrutiny. It is hard to say,
even in 1972, whether the system as charged was discriminatory and invidious
and handicapped poor Black children; however, the Superior Court of the
District of Columbia found that the ’’track system" did discriminate against poor
Black children and ordered its abolishment. Prior to the decision of the court,
however, the Board of Education and most organized segments of the community
had been debating, often bitterly, the merits and motives of the track system,
begun in 1956. It was in this social and political climate that the Board of
Education decided to order a comprehensive study of the "Four Track Curriculum. "
The following excerpt indicates the authorization for the study of the
track system, but also the greatly expanded scope of the study which was finally
authorized. The following report was submitted by the superintendent:
At the September 22, 1965 meeting of the Board of
Education, the Superintendent was authorized to make
arrangements for an outside study of the track system.
The ensuing discussions and developments indicate
that the study should be much broader than an analysis
of our method of ability grouping.
The Superintendent has conducted extensive discussions
with possible research groups and with the Citizens'
Advisory Council. The proposal at this stage is that
arrangements be completed with Teachers College,
Columbia University, for a complete study of the
Washington Public School System with concentration
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upon the instructional, including, as early as possible,
an analysis of the operation ol' the track system and
contributing services, such as administration, treat-
ment of oata, organization for instruction, curriculum
services, supervisory and pupil personnel services.
The objective will be to discover what needs to be done
in the Washington Public School System to develop the
most productive educational opportunity for all members
of the urban community.
The Superintendent is particularly pleased that Teachers
College, one of the great national institutions, has
agreed to accept the responsibility of studying the
Washington Program and to offer its services for follow-
up action for the implementation of recommendations.
The cost of the study is estimated at $200, 000 to
$300, 000, a part of which would be defrayed by monies
available for the already Board-approved data processing
study to be funded in part under the National Defense
Education Act and for the administrative organization
study to be funded under Title V of the Elementary and
Secondary Education Act. The remaining amount of
funding would be under Impact Aid, id legal, or from a
research grant. ^
The Board of Education approved the report of the superintendent, and
Dr. Harry Passow, Teachers College, Columbia University, was named to
head the study. This study, unlike the previous studies discussed, was initiated
by the Board and the superintendent in cooperation with the community. Despite
these favorable conditions, a discussion of the Passow Report in Chapter III
will show that the results were quite similar to those of the other studies.
12
.
'Minutes of the Board of Education, " March 16, 1966:
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The Anaeostia Project
The Anaeostia Project was begun in response to a mandate from the
President of the United States. Although the mandate did not specify the
Anaeostia neighborhood, an advisory panel of citizens and local and federal
agency representaf ives, after an exhaustive study, decided to recommend
Anaeostia to the Board of Education as the project site. Again we have a reform
effort in education initiated by an office outside of the school system - in this
case, by the highest official in our country, the President.
In his March 1968 message to Congress, President Johnson said:
Washington's 150,000 school children and their
parents.
. . must also be able to exercise one of
their most fundamental rights. They must have a
voice which can be heard in the operation of their
school system. ^
President Johnson went further and spelled out the kind of school experi-
ment he envisioned:
I propose a major model school experiment in the
District, embracing a significant area of the city.
This program will:
- Revive the interest of citizens in their schools
- Help teachers improve the skills of their profession
through retraining opportunities
- Bring to students the best in teaching methods and
materials
- Revise the curriculum to make it serve the young
people of our city
- Equip high school graduates with marketable skills
- Seek alliances between employers and the schools
- Give children the chance to learn at their own pace,
reducing both dropouts and failures
^President L. B. Johnson, Budget Message to Congress,
March 1908,
in Fantini and Nickens, op. cit. , p. 3.
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-• Serve a section of the city where the needs of students
and schools are greatest.
To support this program, I have included $10 million
in my 1969 budget for the Office of Education to supplement
the funds providing regular support for the D. C. schools. 14
Launched in this political climate, and with the prestige of the Office
of the President behind this experiment, success would seem relatively
inevitable. Such was not the case, however. At this time, the Anacostia Project
is scheduled to be terminated in August 1972. In Chapter IV, we will examine
the Anacostia Project as a classic example of the ineffectiveness of educational
reform efforts in urban areas.
The Clark Plan
The last effort of educational reform to be discussed is popularly known
as the ’’Clark Plan" after its eminent author, Dr. Kenneth Clark. The official
title, however, is A Possible Reality: A Design for the Attainment of High
Academic Achievement for the Students of the Public Elementary and Junior
High Schools of Washington, D. C, This reform effort was initiated by the
Board of Education, and this fact caused a storm of controversy about the
project which raged for over a year. The nature and objectives of the reform
effort were not new, but the teachers and the community were sharply divided
over how these goals were to be achieved and the "arbitrary manner" in which
the report was approved. Simply stated, the goal of the Clark Pian was to
14
Ibid.
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raise reading and mathematics scores to national norms in one year.
Several of the recommendations within the Clark Plan were challenged
by the Teachers' Union on the grounds that they were considered violations of
the Board of Education-Teacher Union Agreement. The Teachers' Union
objected to the plan for the following reasons: (1) teachers were not involved
in the planning of the Clark Plan; (2) standardized tests were to be administered
to pupils three times a year; (3) differentiated staffing was designed to conform
with the university system, which, in effect, produced a mster teacher
comparable to a full professor at a university; and (4) implied as teachers
interpreted it, accountability and pay differential would be based upon pupil
performance.
The Board of Education approved the Clark Plan on July 13, 1970. Dr.
Clark stated at this meeting that "the basic assumption in the report was that
the students in the public schools of Washington, D. C.
,
were normal human
15beings and that normal human beings, if taught efficiently, would learn. "
The Board of Education, too, was sharply divided on the merits of the Clark
Plan, and in the fall of 1970, the new superintendent officially assumed the
task of implementing this plan. Faced with a divided Board of Education, a firm
timetable for implementation, and a threatened teachers' work stoppage, this
latest effort to reform education in Washington, D. C. , was launched. These
15
"Minutes of the Fourteenth (Special) Meeting of the Board of Education,
"
Washington, D. C.
,
July 13, 1970, p. 4.
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problems will be discussed in detail in Chapter IV.
In this Chapter, we have looked at the social, economic, and political
climates of the District of Columbia and how they impinge upon and influence
the operations of the public schools. We have further looked at the government
of the District of Columbia and its unique relationship to the Congress, and
how this structure affects the District of Columbia public schools. Finally, we
have briefly sketched the nature of the educational reform efforts in the District
of Columbia since 1948. In Chapters III and IV, we shall examine each reform
effort in detail to determine (1) the actual recommendations for reform; (2) the
extent to which those recommendations were actually carried out; (3) how those
recommendations were compromised in the process of their implementation;
and (4) the significant factors in compromising the effectiveness of each of the
suggested reforms.
CHAPTER HI
\
THE STRADER SURVEY, MODEL SCHOOL DIVISION AND THE
PASSOW STUDY
The preceding chapters reviewed the social, economic and political
climate of the District of Columbia and the influence of each upon the functions
of the public schools. Attention was given to the unique characteristics of the
District of Columbia and how its territorial status, under the governance of the
Congress of the United States, had a direct effect upon the public school system.
An effort was made to relate these conditions and characteristics to attempts
at educational reform.
In this chapter The Strayer Survey, The Model School Division and The
Passow Study will be reviewed in detail. The Clark Plan and the Anacostia
Project will be analyzed in Chapter IV. Under consideration are, (1) the actual
recommendations for reform; (2) how the recommendations were compromised
in the process of their implementation; and (3) the significant factors in com-
promising the effectiveness of each of the suggested reforms.
The Strayer Survey
In the opinion of this writer, The Strayer Survey was one of the most
exhaustive and complete surveys ever completed on a major school system. It
would be impossible to discuss all of the recommendations made in the report
which covers every aspect of public school operation in the District of Columbia,
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including elementary, secondary, and vocational education. Included in Dr.
Strayer s fifteen chapter report is a review of and recommendations on all
phases of school administration, operation and maintenance of buildings and
grounds, food services, school buildings and school housing needs, and the
financing of public school education in the District of Columbia. The report's
nine hundred and eight}' pages also include specific recommendations for each
educational topic covered. Since the breadth and detail of the report preclude
a comprehensive analysis of all its components, the author has limited his
discussed to those areas which (1) remain issues today, (2) are still undergoing
reform or study, or (3) impinge upon attempts at educational reform in the last
ten years.
The Strayer Survey suggested that the Board of Education reorganize
its procedures to allow that more adequate consideration be given matters of
major policy. The Strayer Survey particularly criticized the detailed operations
of the Board of Education and its cumbersome "committee system" which
apparently involved the Board in administrative details more appropriately
handled by the Superintendent. As Dr. Strayer put it:
The Board of Education is responsible for the general
management and control of the District School System.
However, the carrying out of this function does not
imply that the administrative detail should be handled
directly by the Board of Education or by committees
representing the Board.
In his evaluation of the rules of the Board, Strayer found confusion be-
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tween policy and procedure. He recommended that far greater discretion be
given to the Superintendent of Schools in the administration of matters of procedure
and in carrying on the routine activities of the schools. 1
There have been several subsequent ineffective attempts to revise the
rules of the Board of Education. For example, a comprehensive study was
undertaken in 1968-69 by an outside consulting firm, which completed over half
of the job - the collection and compilation of all administrative directives and
policy statements. However, the study has never been completed nor have any
plans been made to provide the funds to complete it. While some changes in the
rules of the Board of Education have been made by the Board and the Superintendent
working as a committee, the type of comprehensive rule changes called for by
Dr. Strayer have not yet even been contemplated.
• Of more significance, perhaps, was Strayer's recommendation to abolish
the "committee system" of the Board. For years, until 1968M39, the Board
operated with eight standing committees which held public meetings to discuss
business on the Thursday preceding the regular Wednesday meeting of the Board
of Education. The personnel committee meeting was the only meeting closed
to the public. Shortly after the elected Board took office, the committee system
was eliminated except for personnel matters which were to be handled by the
entire Board sitting as a closed committee of the whole.
"^Strayer, Ibid.
, pp. 37-38.
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In the last two years, however, without actually reversing its previous
action eliminating the committee system, the Board drifted back to the committee
system by creating committees as the need arose to handle such matters as
federal programs, budget matters, employer-employee relations, and so forth.
In other words, the detailed procedural functions which consumed so much of
the Board’s time and cut into the Superintendent's responsibilities have been
2
reinstated with little change from those criticized by Strayer in 1947.
The Board of Education should be a policy making body. Its function is
legislative in character and not administrative. However, in the District of
Columbia, the resurrected committee "system” lends itself to administrative
action. The committees invade the administrative realm and increasingly usurp
responsibility and authority belonging to the Superintendent, the executive
officers of the administrative staff and even the Board of Education as a whole.
As a result, prompt action on the part of administrative personnel is often
impeded as delegated functions are interfered with by Board of Education
committees.
It appears that the Board's practice of dealing with all administrative
matters in detail could not be modified or easily relinquished by its members.
This has been particularly true in matters which affect school operations and
personnel in any of the eight wards. Although it has often been stated that
the Superintendent should be given maximum administrative freedom and held
2
Ibid.
,
p. 38.
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accountable for his actions especially in personnel matters, this has not been
the case.
Strayer recommended that the administrative supervisory staff be
reorganized at the top level on a functional basis with several associate
superintendents in charge. In 1968, following a similar recommendation in the
Passow Study, a major reorgnization of the school system took place which
created several associate superintendent positions in administrative services,
personnel, instructional services, research, planning and innovation, and later
executive management and budget.
Although first called for over 20 years ago and sought many times
thereafter, the addition of several associate superintendents was not well
received by some of the community and staff. Because of the concentration of
administrative personnel in one building, the charge was often made, that
supervisory staff were isolated in a downtown office away from the day-to-day
problems of the school. This, however, was not the case since supervisors
spent four days a week in the field. On the fifth day, they met together in the
central office building to go over the problems that had occurred in the schools,
to plan and evaluate supervisory techniques, and to deal with problems of
supervision.
At this writing, many of the administrative offices have been dispersed
with administrators assigned to various schools in the city. This change was
in large part an economy measure. Under the proposed decentralization plan,
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administrative officers will be assigned to decentralized units throughout the
city. The economics notwithstanding, this should be an effective way of providing
supervisory assistance and was recommended in the writer's
Reorganization of Instructional Services in 1968.
Dr. Sti’ayer saw a real need for reform in the administration of business
affairs.
The setting for the administration of the business
affairs of the Washington Schools is unique. The
administrators in no other large city school system
are as subject to laws, policies, rules, regulations,
opinions and intricate legal structure.
The Survey continued,
A school system to serve children must be flexible;
its needs are constant and inconspicuously changing.
It is extremely difficult to meet these shifting
demands, not to mention emergencies, without a fair
amount of fiscal freedom and administrative freedom
in business affairs comparable with that permitted in
educational affairs. 3
Yet, school business executives are dependent upon the District of
Columbia Government for plant design, construction, maintenance, and for
accounting, auditing, budget control and procurement services. They are guided
by a complex structure of laws affecting federal offices, a District Code,
decisions of the Comptroller General, the Bureau of the Budget, legal opinions,
and the suggestions and requests of District officials and committees of the U.
S. Congress. Fiscally, the schools are affected by the District's financial and
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business policies, and their support is generally dependent upon the overall
financial condition of the District. The District's financial health and well-being
is in turn affected by the way in which Congress appropriates all money used by
the District, including even D. C. tax returns. This unique double dependency
presents Washington school administrators with all of the problems of the
school business executive in a city where the board of education is dependent
upon the city council or equivalent body for financial support and many more.
The business-related problems outlined by Dr. Strayer in 1947 still
plague the District of Columbia schools today but are compounded by growth and
an influx of Federal monies. A recent editorial in the Washington Post is
illustrative:
A good four months ago Washington's taxpayers
learned to their astonishment that the city's public
* school system was so disorganized bureaucratically
and financially that no one could tell for sure whether
it was bankrupt or not. There were reports that the
system might be anywhere from three million to 5.9
million dollars in the red, but the books were in a
shamble and nobody would admit to being in anything
resembling command. ^
Although substantive changes in the business affairs of the scope called
for by Dr. Strayer have not been completed, two of his minor recommendations
have been instituted and are proving economical and effective. These were
(1) the establishment of a mail room equipped for metered mail which
might
4The Washington Post , Monday, April 17, 1972.
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result in economies, and (2) a central store of office supplies which might
produce savings in time and money. Both of these measures have been carried
out largely as Strayer recommended, and the result has been greater efficiency
and promptness in mail delivery.
Dr. Strayer also saw deficiencies in special education, such as: (1) the
lack of a strong central clinic to which all children would be referred for any
type of special service; (2) the lack of supervisory and advisory service for the
physically and mentally handicapped; (3) an inadequate budget; and (4) untrained
teachers in special education. Dr. Strayer’s central recommendation in Special
Education was that "a child adjustment clinic be established to cover the needs
of all children". This clinic would serve not only as a referral center for
analysis, diagnosis, and recommendations for children, but as a treatment
center as well. All children who were to be referred for any special classes or
special services by the Health Department would be referred automatically to
the central clinic for educational evaluation.
After similar recommendations were put forth in the Passow Study, a
department for Special Education has been set up under an associate superin-
tendent during the past school year (1970-71). A reorganization of this
department has been completed, and a substantial increase for the Department
of Special Education was received in the 1971 Appropriations Act for the District
of Columbia. Although the central clinic that Dr. Strayer proposed has
not
been set up as such, it is fair to say that diagnostic and referral
practices have
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impicrved and that the reorganization will insure that a greater amount of
attention is given to those pupils who are physically and mentally handicapped.
One of the paradoxes of the Strayer Survey, written over 25 years ago,
is that most of the problems it identifies still exist in varying forms in 1972.
In the report's summary, Dr. Strayer might have been talking about the current
scene when he stated:
The following steps must be taken to develop an
adequate program for financing the school system
in the District of Columbia: (1) the taxing system
must be modified to produce 15 million dollars to
20 million dollars additional revenue to balance the
District budget. The inequitable features of the present
tax system should be corrected; a reasonable proportion
of the additional revenues appropriated to the school
system would provide the funds necessary to operate
the schools on a defensible basis; (2) the Federal
payment should be increased to a more equitable
relationship with the value of Federal property in the
District and the burdens imposed on the local Government
by the Federal establishment; (3) Financing of the
recommended building program cannot be carried on
the pay-as-you-go plan without an equitable and undesirable
increase in current taxes. The cost can be equalised
over a period of time and the funds be made available
when needed with the judicious use of credit. The funds
should be advanced by the Federal Government on a
definite repayment schedule, or the District Government
should be authorized to issue serial bonds to be paid from
debt service appropriations from District revenues;
(4) the system of fiscal control should be simplified. The
authorities responsible for the operation of the District
Government should be given fiscal powers commensurate
with their responsibilities. While the Congress must retain
the legislative authority and also review the actions of the
District Government for the protection of Federal interests,
there is little justification for the detailed controls now
exercised by Federal authorities. A functional relationship
between the needs and the desires of the citizens of the
4G
District (or education services and the methods for
financing these services can be attained when fiscal
authority coexists with administrative responsibility. 'a
The debate over increased taxes and an increased Federal payment still
rages today with these critical issues far from resolution. The fiscal needs of
the school system as outlined by school officials and the School Board are still
not acknowledged or supported by other important segments of the community.
In large measure, the Strayer Survey was compromised by two realities
which still haunt those seeking educational reform in the city. They are (1) the
estimated cost of the reforms and (2) the lack of authority on the part of both
the Board of Education and Washington, D. C. citizens to implement a report
which was initiated, supervised and funded by the Congress of the United States.
Model School Division
In the early stages of the war on poverty one inner city region - The
Cardozo High School - was chosen initially to receive a saturation of innovative
educational and social programs to measure the impact of increased resources
on deprived areas. However, responding to a report issued by the President's
Science Advisory Committee, the District of Columbia Public School System
soon embraced the idea of creating a model subsystem out of the chosen inner
city target area. This concept and the Superintendent's proposed program for
action were approved by the Board of Education of the District of Columbia on
5
Strayer, op. c it.
,
p. 980.
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June 17, 1964. The Superintendent's rationale for recommending adoption of
the subsystem concept and his hopes for the program were in part set forth in
his memo to the Committee on Finance, Personnel, Student Activities, and
Health and Special Education Services of the Board of Education. The Superinten-
dent justified his recommendation with the following report to the Board of
Education:
The target area program contains many programs
which are inherent in the model school concept.
These goals are now integral parts of the total
community action program being developed in other
cities in the country and represented in the District
of Columbia by United Planning Organization efforts.
The Model Schools Division planning was given further
impetus by the publication on March 1964 of Innovation
and Experiment in Education
,
a progress report of the
panel on Educational Research and Development of the
United States Commission of Education, the Director
of the National Science Foundation, and the Special
Assistant to the President for Science and Technology.
The report proposed a novel concept for dealing with
educational problems which it was felt had great
possibilities for adaptation to the educational needs of the
District of Columbia. This concept embraced the idea
of an experimental school subsystem, a model sub-
system, to be instituted in an inner city area in a medium
size or large city.
The new wave in educational research and development
had been devoted largely to the design and writing of
better instructional materials. At the same time there
had been some experimenting with the institutional
aspects of the schools - team teaching, non-graded
structures, after school tutoring programs and the like.
Until the advent of the Model School Division however,
such programs had been along lines fixed in advance.
What you could do along one line was limited by what you
could not do along another. The proper unit for institutional
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innovation and experiment was a cluster of schools in
the school system.
Administratively, this cluster could be described as
a model system within the regular system which
included a high school, contemplates preschool centers,
elementary schools and junior high schools that fed
into it. This cluster would also include a vocational
high school, either in or out of the selected area and
provision for post-high school training. It was con-
sidered essential that vocational and/or occupational
and technical training be available to pupils desiring
that kind of educational program. This procedure
would define an area and the area chosen should have
certain characteristics - a high rate of unemployment,
sub-standard housing, a high incidence of juvenile
delinquency, and other social and economic problems
which plague large center city areas. This approach
makes essential the development of a sequential program.
New results with a child in the first grade make necessary
new things in the second grade and so on through high
school. As innovations in the model subsystem are
developed and proved of value they ought to be introduced
as rapidly as feasible into our schools on a city-wide
basis.
As Washington, D. C. develops this program we will work
in close cooperation with other cities carrying out similar
projects, and in addition have access to outstanding educators
and other government and private resources for advice.
The Superintendent thus believes that the concept of a
model school subsystem has greater potential for total
impact in conjunction with a community action program
than did the original concept. The inner city area planning
will be a part of the model system approach which does not
assume that we know all the answers and have simply to
pour in more resources. It is however an across-the-board
experiment - curriculum development, utilization of
teachers, the management of the system itself - with
provision for rapid feedback of results and rapid exploitation
of new opportunities. The hope is to develop effective
patterns of schooling that can be adopted at considerably
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less expense by other parts of the school system and
other school systems across the nation. Much work
still needs to be done in developing and implementing
this idea, and the Superintendent finds merit in the
opportunity afforded to work jointly on these problems
with national leaders in education. 6
A committee was formed to develop and adopt a plan of action to imple-
ment the model school subsystem concept. Judge David Bazelon was selected
chairman. The Assistant Superintendent in charge of the Model School Division
met regularly with this committee to develop plans for the model subsystem.
The controversy which ensued will be discussed below.
During its initial year of operation, 1964-1965, the model subsystem
structure consisted of an assistant superintendent, a director of programs,
and assistant director, and a small clerical staff. The assistant superintendent
did'not have line authority over the subsystem schools themselves; he was
given responsibility only for those special programs not considered part of
the regularly offered school program. Teachers, principals, and supervisors
continued to be responsible to the departments of elementary and secondary
education. All elementary principals, therefore reported to the Assistant
Superintendent for Elementary Education just as all secondary principals
reported to the Assistant Superintendent for Secondary Education. Principals
were responsible to the Assistant Superintendent of the Model School Division
only for new and experimental programs.
^Report to the Board of Education, June 11, 1964.
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The Model School Division administration prepared budget requests for
special programs which were submitted to the United Planning Organization.
The division had no formal control over regular budget allocations for its 19
schools. The introduction of the "model" programs and new ideas were
traumatic enough in themselves. But with a second authority figure to deal
with, many principals became extremely ill-at-ease and had difficulty adjusting
to the newly imposed duality of control and functions.
In the Model School Division's second year of operation, a decision was
made to transfer operating control of the 19 schools from secondary and
elementary school departments to the Assistant Superintendent, Model School
Division. At the same time it was made clear that other school departments
of the system were to continue to service the Model School Division. With the
transfer of control, some of the problems of the Model School Division were
eliminated. For example, one rather small but significant action was the
requirement that all principals meet together regardless of level; while at
the outset there was great resistance to the idea of bringing elementary and
secondary principals together, principals gradually came to view the education
of their children as a continuous process, and each began to see that by
planning
they could develop more effective team approach to educational
problems.
Still, the fuzziness about the mission and role of the Model
School
Division persisted. In an effort to clarify and redefine
the Model School
Division role within the system, the Board of Education
on June 30, 1967,
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reaffirmed its commitment to the Division and to the following policies and
procedures governing its operation: (1) that the Model School Division has
the authority to deploy all specialized teaching personnel and all supervisory
personnel to insure effective coordination of departmental activities with
experimental programs in the Model School Division; (2) that the Model School
Division has the authority to disseminate experimental programs and curricula
of demonstrated validity and applicability throughout the Model School Division,
even though these programs and curricula may not be represented in the
standard departmental courses of study; and (3) that the Model School Division
has the authority for direct purchase of experimental materials through the
Assistant Superintendent of the Model School Division.
Although the panel of consultants hired to assist in the development of the
model subsystem concept had recommended funding at about the $10 million
level, or two to three times the per pupil expenditure of the regular schools,
the schools in question were never funded at such high levels. Indeed, The
Model School Division received little, if any funding more than its schools
would have received had the Division not been formallj^ organized.
From its inception, the Model School Division was supported primarily
through regular school appropriations, Impact Aid Funds for the eligible
schools, Economic Opportunity Act Funds, and ESEA Funds. However, only
EOA Funds and ESEA Funds have been used for the Model School Division's
special projects. The highest amount received additionally per pupil from
ESEA
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and Impact Aid Funds was less than a hundred dollars per student, an amount
not in excess of the fair share which would have been received normally based
on the proportion of Title I and Impact Aid formula children attending Model
Schools compared to the total number of these children in all city schools.
Nonetheless, the amount of funding was a constant source of irritation and
controversy. Many felt that the Model Schools Division was receiving a great
deal of extra money; and they believed that the money should be shared equally
across the system.
In reality, it merely looked as if the Division had additional monies. What
made the difference was not the funds available but the authority to spend them
in a different way. Thus, the classrooms in the Model School Division were
vibrant with new science curricula, new science materials, new math materials.
The* rooms took on an open and lively look. This was in contrast to other
classrooms in other parts of the city which did not have the option to buy the
same materials. In addition, the Division's teachers were trained to utilize
these materials, and, as a result, the classrooms, pupils and parents reflected
this different type of operation.
In spite of these changes in some of the Model School Division class-
rooms, the severe delays in funding during the first two years of operation did
not improve with the stabilization of ESEA and Impact Aid appropriations.
Repeated delays and cut-backs made it difficult to plan and carry out objective
program evaluations. Programs often could not be implemented until the
size
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of the governmental appropriation was known - sometimes not until late in the
school year. —
~
Programs developed during the Model School Division's first year of
operation placed strong emphasis on staff development and reading instruction.
There was also a great deal of emphasis on school-community relations,
largely carried out through school community councils, and some evaluation
took place.
The objective of the Model School Division's Staff Development Program
was to achieve and maintain the highest possible level of staff competence.
Each staff member from administrator and teacher to custodian and cafeteria
worker was considered an integral part of the educational process, learning
and growing along with the students with whom they interacted and supported.
* Perhaps the most effective staff development technique used in the Model
School Division was the Innovation Team, a group of teachers who assist
classroom teachers in improving instructional techniques. Many methods were
used to improve classroom teaching: school-day in-service programs and
workshops; innovative materials, equipment and instruction; supportive
p
services in the classroom based upon the individual needs of the classroom
teacher and those of her students; the development and use of curriculum
materials which were responsive to the times and childrens' needs; assistance
from outside consultants; and summer institutes which helped the teacher
develop
new instructional techniques and which provided organizational
assistance and
sensitivity awareness.
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The Innovation Team tried to enhance and amplify the resources and
strengths of individual teachers so that they may more successfully develop
the capabilities of individual children through meaningful educational experiences.
The Team offered peer assistance without any evaluation. It was available to
teachers at their request to assist with problems.
The chief characteristic of reading instruction in the Model School
Division was that of the eclectic or combination approach to reading instruction.
Whenever possible, two or more programs were combined together with
supplementary materials and audio visual aids to provide teachers with the
possibility of providing their pupils a multi-media, multi-sensory, balanced
program in reading instruction in which reading, writing, speaking, and
listening served to reinforce each other. The combination approach was in
harmony with a marked trend throughout the country for greater emphasis on
individualized instruction to meet the needs, attitudes and feelings of each
child. Some 12 to 14 reading programs are currently used throughout the
Model School Division schools including Bank Street Readers, Initial Teaching
Alphabet, Language Experiences in Reading, Learning to Think Series and
Project Read.
I n program evaluation, the Division faced some handicaps. Research
and evaluation within the system had typically been spotty and dependent
upon
either the availability of the assistant superintendent in charge
of research and
his very small staff or money from outside sources to hire
review and research
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assistants from private concerns. Nonetheless, some evaluation has taken
place. For example, in a report prepared by the Department of Research
and Evaluation, Division of Planning, Innovation and Research, September
1969, a three-year study of the reading achievement of 4th and 6th grade
students in the Model School Division was provided. It was based upon STEP
(Sequential Test of Educational Progress) scores for the school years 1966
through 1969 of students who remained in the same school for the three -year
period thereby receiving essentially the same programs and treatment.
Any effort to evaluate The Model School Division should take into
account Dr. Harry Passow's observations as articulated in his study of the
D. C. schools.
Since its inception, the Model School Division has been
a source of controversy primarily in terms of its
mission and its funding. Its dependence on partial
funding from outside sources, its involvement with
lay organizations, and its special position within the
school’s bureaucratic structure has caused many
problems. The Superintendent of Schools saw the
Model School Division primarily as a demonstration
unit - not necessarily as a creator of innovations; a
model subsystem designed to insure the infusion of new
ideas and lessen institutional reluctance of departing
from existing procedures. The United Planning
Organization on the other hand tended to view the Model
School Division only in terms of ’shaking up the system
itself' by developing different patterns of schooling. Ihe
Model School Division described its special mission in
its June 1967 report as "an across-the-board experiment
-
curriculum development, utilization of teachers; the
management of the system itself - with provisions for. . .
rapid exploitation of new opportunities for inner city
children.
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The Division does have many gains to its credit. It
appears they have accomplished much in bringing
elementary and secondary school principals together
in a meaningful dialogue. It has developed an esprit-
de-corps within its staff. The materials it has
distributed have apparently enriched the programs. It
has launched several challenging upgraded and team
teaching projects. Significantly, it has found ways to
draw upon research relating to innovation. The Model
School Division might well become increasingly productive
given appropriate support - administratively and
financially.
The Model School Division represents the closest thing
available in Washington to a system for initiating and
testing ideas new to the District School System. Problems
have flowed, of course, from the joint funding by the
District Schools and the United Planning Organization,
as well as from confusion over the interrelationships
among two agencies and the Model School Advisory
Committee. The relationship between United Planning
Organization's education section of the Model School
Division has stuck on the point of program initiation -
where it is to come from and who is to determine its
dimensions. There are diametrically opposing views as
to the seat of authority for program development as
contrasted with program approval. There arc also dis-
putes over the relationship of the Model School Division
to the rest of the school system.
The basic question is whether the Model School Division
is really to be autonomous, solvent, and free. Finally,
there is the basic question of demonstration versus
innovation. Demonstration would simply involve locating
good ideas and putting them into practice for the inservice
edification of other school staffs. However, if Model
School Division is to innovate, then its role involves some
demonstration and dissemination of course, but even more
program planning and experimental development.
The request of the Model School Division for $100,000 for
planning purposes firms up a position which has been
wavering. Evaluation of the quality and impact of Model
School Division programs has been erratic. The lack of
ongoing research and evaluation for the Model School
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Division has been cited
defects. 7
previously as one of its major
The Washington Post 's December 1970 analysis of the Model Schools
is also instructive:
For six years the Washington School System has been
trying in a limited way to do the two things the Superin-
tendent of Schools, Hugh J. Scott has put at the top of
his list of educational reforms needed here; they arc
decentralization - dividing the 145,000 pupil - system
into smaller more manageable units - and intensive
teacher training.
The place where they are being tried is the Model School
Division - Cardozo High School and the four junior highs
and 16 elementary schools that feed into it. All serving
inner city youngsters in Northwest Washington.
. .
With
its twin emphasis on smallness and "staff development,"
the Model School Division thus seems very much in the
Scott mold.
The Model Schools do seem different from others in
Washington; they have a distinct freshness about them;
more than elsewhere in the city it is possible to find
teachers and students doing old things in new ways - the
result of the intense teacher training which is the work
of a group called the Innovation Team. Some of the
Division's six-year olds learn to read from soup cans
and milk cartons and soap wrappers. Their first words
may be "Dial" as in soap; "Bean-with-bacon" as in soup
and "hi" as in Hi C orange drink. Some teachers have
replaced traditional classroom furniture with bookcases
and independent study centers made of heavy-duty card-
board. The Division's 16,000 children are the authors
and illustrators of a poignant book with a national circulation
in education circles - "The Children of Cardozo 1 ell It
Like It is.
But the heart of its effort has been the Innovation Team - 18
teachers -of-teachers who move through the Division's
~~~
^lbid.
, pp0 375-381.
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schools spreading new ideas, methods and materials.
Depending on who you talk to this emphasis on teacher
training has accomplished a great deal with very little
or very little with a great deal, or something in between.
Again, here evidence is sketchy and contradictory.
. .
Information on how much money goes into the Division
is as scanty and inconclusive as the information on pupil
achievement. Nickens, the Division's first superintendent,
who now is Deputy of Superintendent of Instruction for the
entire system, contends that the Division has never gotten
much, if any more money than any one else, only the free-
dom to spend it differently. Mary Lela Sherburne, another
founder of the Model School Division and still closely
associated with it as Director of a regional federally financed
pilot community program, estimates a spending difference
as at most $100 per pupil in any given year. A reporter's
analysis of school-by-school operating costs for the 1969-
1970 school year, compiled by the school system for the
U. S. Court of Appeals and Judge J. Skelly Wright supports
this view. Spending per pupil from regular and regular funds
for the Division's elementary pupils was $684.00 - $700,00
more than the city-wide spending, but $29.00 less than the
average in the 13 elementaries west of the Rock Creek Park. ^
* Despite the mixed reactions, there is no doubt but that many of the
programs started in the Model School Division have been introduced into the
system as a whole. Team teaching, ungradedness, many new reading programs,
Innovation Teams, School Managers, direct purchases and procurement of
materials for classrooms all have in some form either been called for in the
system at large or established in some school communities. In addition:
(1) The Model School Division created the best staff development model
that
has been put forth in some years - the Innovation Team - a group of highly
skilled teachers who worked with other teachers on a peer basis with no
^Washington Post
,
December 2, 1970, p. Bl.
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authority or power to evaluate or rate teachers. The impact of this team was
felt far beyond the Model School Division because it was called upon to give
workshops and provide assistance in other troubled areas of the system. In
fact, this very demand upon the team's energy and time affected its ability to
serve the Model School area; jt was impossible for 18 teachers to service an
entire school system. The need for additional Innovation Teams could not bo
met because of a lack of resources and time. Replication of the Innovation
Team could not be achieved simply by producing new people and calling them
Innovation Team members. Training had to be provided and skills developed
over a period of time. (2) The Model School Division demonstrated that
classrooms can be alive and fresh and that teachers, parents and school of 1 jeers
working together can plan programs and carry them out for the good of
children. (3) The Model School Division proved beyond doubt that given an
opportunity to communicate, the teachers and principal can develop an esprit-
de-corps which will allow them to overcome initial feelings of distrust.
(4) The Model School Division developed a Center for the Innovation Team
which attracted not only adults and citizens of the community, but teachers
from other areas outside the metropolitan school district who came in to
attend workshops and look over the large number of materials, textbooks
and
other items collected for viewing, handling, and learning how to do.
The Model School Division was handicapped by: (1) a lack of
continuous
funding which would enable it to build and plan programs; (2)
a bureaucratic
GO
structure which did not lend itself to the need and desire to respond quickly
to problems; (3) an absence of funding that was unencumbered by the legal
restrictions imposed by the District of Columbia and Federal Governments;
(4) the absence of a mechanism for incorporating what was learned in the
Model School Division by the rest of the system; (5) a general misunderstanding
and distrust of the Model School Division, its goals and financing; (6) the School
System's inability to accept a sectional, autonomous resources and development
unit; and (7) the system's lack of commitment to the idea of the Model School
Division, to experimentation and innovation.
Tn the absence of total commitment by this or any other school system,
no innovative educational experiment can succeed. With a total commitment,
however, administrators can program resources over a five-year period and
plan a continuing program which will have some chance of success. The
necessity to fight for every dollar and every new idea disspiates the energy of
those who have been charged with the responsibility for making new ideas
work.
Toward Creating a Model Urban School System
Unlike the Strayer Survey, the Passow Study was initiated by the Board
of Education and the Superintendent in cooperation with the community. It
was
approved by the Board of Education largely as a result of the controversy
raging over the Four Track Curriculum then in effect. The scope of
the study
was enlarged, however, to include the entire school system.
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Developed with the assistance of Teachers College, Columbia University,
the study was conducted by 33 task forces, each headed by a specialist. 9
Task force chairmen, aided by consultants and graduate students, visited
classes and schools interviewed students, staff, members of the community
and school and community leaders of many kinds, administered questionnaires
and inventories to pupils and staff members, examined pertinent pupil records
and other school data; analyzed existing resources and materials as well as
curriculum bulletins and guides; examined reports from other agencies and
offices and drew on appropriate data sources wherever they could be found.
Since the District Schools are surely among the most surveyed and investigated
in the Nation, early reports on the schools were studied as well, dating back
to the report of the Advisory Committee on Education in 1938.
-10
The Passow Report was presented to the Board of Education in September
1967 at which time the Board created a review mechanism for input from
community groups, staff, students and professional groups. The review
structure included an executive study group, a community council and 25 working
parties formed to study specific sections of the report. The common goal was
to propose those changes that would effect maximum improvement in the
D. C. public schools in order to insure quality education for all.
The process,
9The personnel of the task forces and a detailing of the inventories
and
instruments used are found in Appendix A of the report.
^Toward Creating A Model Urban Sc hool System - A Study of the
Washington*, D. C. Public Schools. A. Horry Passow,
Teachers College,
Columbia University, New York, 196/.
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as far as can be determined, represented the most extensive involvement and
cooperation in the analysis and proposed rebuilding of a school system ever
undertaken by the school community of any large city. This was in marked
contrast to the Strayer Survey which saw little or no concentrated effort at
implementation.
On July 17, 1S68, the Executive Study Group, under the chairmanship of
Mrs. Anita Allen, Vice President of the Board, made its report to the Board
of Education. Two sections of this report are significant:
The Board quite clearly recognized that those who glibly
proposed implementing the Columbia University recom-
mendations as published, had not read them. The Columbia
University Report describes in great detail what is wrong
with the schools, but gives suggestions for change in only
the broadest terms. Dr. Passow himself suggested to this
Board that no improvement in the schools could be achieved
without the full participation the Board so wisely saw fit to
* include in the Executive Study Group review structure.
As far as we are concerned the specific recommendations
growing out of the joint Board, administration, teacher
and community involvement now supplant the more general
directions provided in the Columbia University Report and
should be published by the Board and made widely available
throughout the school system and community as a blue print
for change.
The second important aspect of this Report is reflected in these words,
Briefly the Executive Study Group envisioned a school system
which centers around the child and which has adequate tools
to meet the needs of every child in the system. . . The focus
of such a system must be instruction and the tools of instruc-
tion staff, materials, curriculum - must undergo continuous
-^Executive Study Group for Model Urban School System for the District
of Columbia, July 17, 1968.
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progressive development in order to serve each child
adequately. Instruction should be individualized so that
each child's particular strength can be used as a
foundation upon which to build. The system which best
serves the child must involve the total community in both
the continued education of the community and the con-
tinuous participation of the community in planning for the
educational process.
Flexibility, planning, change and evaluation must be
built into the school system so that it can continue to
meet the needs of children. We do not see the school
system we propose as a rigid structure, but rather as the
beginning of a process of evaluation. 12
The recommendations of the Executive Study Group approved in concept
at the July 30, 1968 meeting of the Board of Education, were to be used as a
guide for instituting comprehensive reform in the school system. With the
assistance of an office created especially to implement the Executive Study
Group recommendations, the administration would have the capacity to develop
m .
full-scale plans for the proposed reform efforts. The Superintendent and
his staff reviewed all Study Group reports to determine the implications for
all divisions of the school system. Each division was charged with developing
action blue prints "for phasing in its operational change.
" These action blue
prints were to describe the phasing in in terms of target date, funding
and
human resources necessary to meet intended goals.
The Passow Study, like other major reports on the D. C. schools, is
voluminous and comprehensive; only some of its
recommendations will be
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discussed here. Singled out for analysis are those recommendations which
bear upon school operations today or which impact upon future operations of
the school.
Dr. Passow strongly recommended decentralization and the Executive
Study Group supported him and recommended that the school system decentral-
ize, but that changes be made in such a manner as to insure the greatest
possible success for the reorganization. According to the study, decentrali-
zation could help the school system realize two objectives: (1) an effective
school organization which will facilitate teaching and learning; and (2) short-
ened communication lines with parents and citizens integrally involved in the
educational process. Built into the system's central organization is a lack of
responsiveness to the needs of students, parents, and teachers. A decentral-
ized system might alleviate these problems by bringing administration closer
to the buildings, their personnel and students, providing the flexibility and
freedom necessary to develop and carry out responsive and innovative programs,
and by providing a mechanism which would allow the intensive focusing of
resources and insuring accountability for performance. In addition, by
increasing community participation and control, the school program could
be reinforced by the community after being shaped with its needs and
wishes
foremost in mind.
The author, in a report submitted to the Board, "The Five
Year Plan
for Improving Instructional Services in the Division of
Instruction" hypothesized
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that greater efficiency in the delivery of services to improve instruction
could be accomplished through either of two means - the formal decentralization
into districts or the decentralization of services so that they are closer to the
user, i. e.
,
the school and the students. The summary of this plan is attached
as an appendix.
In response to the recommendation for decentralization, the Status
Report on Implementation of Specific Executive Study Group recommendations,
based on the Passow Report, stated:
The school system now has four differing extremes
in decentralization: The Model School Division,
The Morgan and Adams Community Schools, The
Anacostia Project, and The Fort Lincoln New Town
Project. 13
The Model School Division was created almost five years ago as a semi-
autonomous subsystem. As the other decentralization experiments took hold,
a mechanism was needed to link the decentralized units with the central
administration. The most favorable solution was the creation of a special
division as a part of the Superintendent's Office. And so the Division of
Special Projects came into being to serve a two-fold need - giving the de-
centralized units direct access to the office of the Superintendent and fieeing
them from much time-consuming procedural red tape. Accordingly, these
decentralized units are being given as much autonomy and as much admini-
strative support as is presently feasible.
13
Executive Study Group, Ibid. , p. 9.
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However, it is fair to say that the decentralization envisioned by Dr.
Passow replete with community superintendents and elected local school
boards is nowhere in existence. The Board has twice turned down proposed
system-wide decentralization plans. The first reorganization along these
lines, proposed by former Superintendent Dr. Manning, was based on existing
high school boundaries. Objections to his proposal included: (1) the
proliferation of administrative staff; (2) the diversity of size in the proposed
districts with the population ranging from roughly 30, 000 pupils in one district
to approximately 15, 000 in another district; (3) the fact that the new districts
would not be contiguous to the eight Board of Education Wards. The second
decentralization plan that was rejected by the School Board was presented
informally by Dr. Scott. He is currently revising that plan and is scheduled
to p'resent a revision of it to the Board in late Summer, 1972.
Another Passow recommendation called for administrative reorganization
to bring greater efficiency to the operation of the Superintendent's Office.
The plan proposed was: (1) that the Vice Superintendent be in charge of the
day-to-day operations of the school system; (2) that the central administration
include four divisions - one headed by a Deputy Superintendent and the
other
three headed by Associate Superintendents each performing a clearly
delineated
function; (3) that the Division of Instruction, headed by a
Deputy Superintendent,
should be the dominant division of the system; (4) that the
Division of Planning,
Innovation and Research be concerned with long-range
planning and provide
G7
information and guidance for the progressive evaluation ol die Division of
Instruction; (5) that the Division of Administrative Services be the facilitating
agency for the Division of Instruction and that service not shape the instructional
program; and (G) that the Division of Personnel also serve as a facilitating
agency for the Division of Instruction. This recommended reorganization of
central administration offices was authorized by the Board of Education at its
meeting of August 15, 1968. ^ It is significant to note that the administrative
reorganization now being prepared by the Superintendent will modify and
significantly change this organization which was effected in 1968.
Another major recommendation in The Passow Study concerns finance
and the budgetary process. The Executive Study Cxroup recommended that the
school budget be written in terms of educational objectives. The budget, it
was reasoned, should therefore be prepared by the Department of Planning,
Research and Innovation, the office responsible for identifying specific and
long-range educational objectives. Such goals should be set by the Board of
Education through a continuing dialogue between the Board, the school admini-
stration, and the community.
It was further recommended that a Program-Rlanning-Budgeting System
should be utilized which would make resource allocation dependent upon
desired
educational results. Budget items should be presented as programs in
order
.of priority with each item including projected results if appropriations
weie
14
Status Report, p. 7.
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smaller than those requested and specific gains were they larger. The line
item form of budget should be abandoned.
The Passow Study also recommended that the Congress or other funding
authority should commit itself to approving Capital Outlay Programs six years
in advance to permit advance site acquisition. The District should be per-
mitted to issue bonds for facility construction to be retired out of property
tax revenue. The responsibility for school site acquisition, facility design
and maintenance should be transferred to the school administration. In
addition, Passow recommended that a revolving fund should be established so
that purchases for any fiscal year can be made prior to the start of that year,
and a management analyst in the Division of Administrative Services should
be assigned as a trouble shooter for procurement distribution and materials
accounting problems.
The Passow Study also recommended that the Board of Education should
impress upon Congress the tremendous need for additional funds for education
in the District. The Board should petition Congress from the City Government
to permit the D. C. Government to handle its entire budget, to levy taxes
on incomes of all those who work in the District, and to increase its Federal
payment, either to the amount which would accrue if a property tax were to
apply to Federal property or specifically for education to the amount
which
the average city of its size would receive under state aid to
education. However
without these provisions, the schools should not be cut
loose from Federal
responsibility.
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This major recommendation is still far from being implemented. First,
the budget writing function has not been placed in the Department of Planning,
Innovation and Research. Rather, the Budget Office incorporated a program
planning and budgeting system for FY 1971. Broad educational goals established
by the Board of Education Were used as a basis for formulating the FY 1971
budget.
The second major attempt at implementation took the form of a Budget
Committee request that individual schools prepare budgets using the program
method. Forms were constructed by the schools that provided quantitative
information to enable the Budget Department to prepare justifications in terms
of educational output. However, the time sequence was tight, and although
many of the schools prepared sophisticated budget requests, they received very
little in the way of return or feedback for their efforts. This lack of positive
response to the work performed within the schools took two forms: first,
the individual school requests were often completely submerged within the
larger report and, therefore, did not surface in recognizable form; and second,
many individual requests were flatly rejected. Schools simply were not gi\en
the option of vastly increasing some services to the exclusion of others. As
a result, a great deal of ill will was generated because many school personnel
and their parent-teacher associations felt that they had been invited to
engage
in an exercise in futility.
Other weaknesses of the local budgeting exercise were that no
ball-park
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figure was given to the schools and, in addition, there was no time to inform
and assist the school officials and parents who were to participate in the new
budgeting process. Therefore, the sophistication of the school personnel, the
neighborhood and its parent-teacher association often had a significant impact
upon the kind of budget document that emerged. Nonetheless, this plan, in
principle, is an excellent one, and with modifications could be very effective.
Like Dr. Strayer before him, Dr. Passow was critical of the District's
Special Education Programs. He recommended that an Office of Special
Education be created under the Division of Instruction to coordinate existing
programs and to develop new programs based on the individual needs of the
children assigned to it. All children referred to the Division by diagnostic
teachers would be placed in a special class in their home school whenever
possible on the theory that a child should not be categorized according to the
nature of his problem (deafness, retardation, etc. ) but rather on the basis of
the prescribed methods of achieving results with him. At its August 15, 1968
meeting, the Board of Education approved the establishment of The Department
of Special Education referred to earlier.
A related recommendation made by Dr. Passow calls for tuition grants
for children who cannot be provided for in the regular school program. The
response to this provision has been overwhelming, and the system has been
unable to meet the needs of all interested children. However, when the
reorganization plan proposed by the Associate Superintendent for
Special
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Education is implemented, the system will sharply reduce the waiting list on a
phase basis until all children needing special help are accommodated. The
Board underscored the necessity of providing an education for all District
children when, as a result of a court suit brought by a group of parents, it
voted to provide free education to all children. Board action will guarantee that
children with special handicaps, who are currently forced to remain at home,
will have access to the schools.
The Passow Report called for the creation of a Bilingual School to
include the standard curriculum in Spanish, intensive course work in English
as a second language, and orientation of children to North American cultural
patterns and history. It was recommended that Spanish-speaking children in
scattered city locations be bussed to this school and that some English speaking
children be admitted to increase their appreciation of diverse languages and
cultures. It was also suggested that evaluations be made of students to
determine when they are sufficiently competent in English to be placed in an
English language instructional program.
One bilingual program has been developed by the Model School Division
in cooperation with the parents, teachers, students in the Oyster area
where
the Spanish speaking population of the District is concentrated. A proposal
describing this program was approved by the Board of Education at its
meeting of January 15, 1969, for submission to the U. S. Office of
Education
for funding under Title VII of the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act.
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Last year, under the Bilingual Act, a group of teachers were trained in
cooperation with the District of Columbia Teachers College, and a Bilingual
Elementary School was opened. The school is supposed to have a fifty per
cent Spanish speaking and fifty per cent English speaking student body.
Curriculum materials were developed in both languages, and, to date, pre-
liminary evaluations indicate that the school has been very successful. Indeed,
plans are currently being made to expand the school so that the opportunities it
offers can be available to more students. At present there are also bilingual
education classes in one other elementary school within the Model School
Division.
There are some factors which threatened to compromise the affectiveness
of this Bilingual program at Ctyster School. First of all, it was viewed with
hostility by many members of the community. While most agreed that it would
be a positive force, many community residents did not want it in their neighbor-
hood. Secondly, operational red tape took its toll in that six months expired
before the contract became operational. Consequently, the money for teacher
training, supplies and materials were held up, and little school time remained
to carry out the goals of the program and make delivery on the high expectancies
of a community which had difficulty understanding the working of the bureau-
cratic structure in the first place. Nevertheless the Oyster School in
North-
west Washington is a case in point of overcoming such difficulty and
providing
a good program. Oyster, which services large numbers of English
and
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Spanish-speaking children, has successfully instituted a strong bilingual
program which seems worthy of imitation in other city schools. All subjects
in the school are offered in both languages and language is taught through subject
matter. The nine Spanish-speaking teachers are aided by 70 Spanish volunteers
who serve as tutors and playground aides. Both cultures receive equal attention,
time and respect with Spanish and English-speaking children benefiting.
Yet this concept, worthy of replication in schools with population mixes
of any kind, has not been adopted by the system. Similarly, teacher approaches
which have brought promising results - such as the fostering of self-confidence
and self-awareness through open and often child-structured programming -
It:
continue as isolated experiments.
Dr. Passow called for the establishment of a strong office of staff
development in the Division of Instruction to be responsible for the development
of programs at all levels in the school system. The report recommended that
15-20 per cent of a teacher's time be devoted to staff development activities
during the regular school day. The rationale was clear,
If quality education is to materialize in the District
schools, the major focus of efforts must be on the
personnel who conduct the educational programs and
arrange the conditions for learning; this includes all
instructional staff: teachers, administrators, super-
visors, supporting service personnel, aides and
volunteers, custodians and clerks. It has been
recommended that a massive inservice continuing
15
Washington Star, "Washington" Sunday July 2, 1972, pp.
5-8.
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program be shaped and tailored to all personnel,
professional and paraprofessional. No substantive
improvement will be realized by simply publishing
a new curriculum guide nor adopting another text-
book. Not only classroom teachers, but principals,
supervisors, and other leadership personnel require
ongoing and continuing education. This comprehensive
schema for professional growth will require staff,
time allocation, and funding of an unprecedented order.
True, city systems have had inservice courses; they
have provided for attendance at courses in nearby
colleges and universities; they have made other
arrangements. The prescription for Washington differs
by integrating continuing education into the total
professional armament of all the District's educators.
When combined with a redevelopment program and a
long range operation, the District schools could realize
considerable upgrading.
The report also called for the establishment of an advisory council of
representatives from school systems, colleges, universities, community
agencies and institutions to work on policy matters and programs at the office
0
of staff development.
The recommendation on Staff Development was partially implemented
with the opening of the Office of Staff Development on February 1, 1969. Since
that time, a number of staff development programs have been initiated. While
the Office of Staff Development quickly became a very effective operation, its
existence was shortlived. Indeed, budget cuts by the City Council actually
resulted in the demise of the office two years after its inception. The
director's
position was reduced in classification through the same budget
action, and the
^Passow, Ibid .
,
pp. 381-382.
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remaining funds were placed in the office of the Deputy Superintendent. The
small amount of money that was left necessitated a sharp curtailment in staff
development activities.
Finally, Passow made a series of specific recommendations on staff
personnel procedures.
1. It is recommended that the school system prepare
or have prepared an attractive recruitment brochure
designed to show the multitude of advantages of
teaching in the District of Columbia. The brochure
should be positive in approach showing educational,
cultural and living advantages and represent a
continuous effort with appropriate financial support
to attract good teachers.
This recommendation has been implemented and with the result that very
attractive brochures have been issued for the last two years.
2. That new sources be explored in recruiting new
personnel, especially teachers.
This recommendation has been partially carried out. A Division of Recruit-
ment was formally established under the Associate Superintendent in Charge
of Personnel, and the division has vigorously recruited teachers. However,
there has been little liaison between the Recruitment Office and the Budget
Office, and in some instances more teachers have been recruited than were
allowed for in the budget. The resulting confusion has created unnecessary
problems such as the honoring of contractual agreements which were not
in
the best interests of the school system.
3.
That the functions of certification and appoint-
ment be clearly delineated and separated and
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that separate sub-office units be established to
handle these functions.
Although this recommendation has in effect, been implemented, some confusion
still exists as to the separation of the two roles of appointment and certification.
4.
That the new personnel procedures authorized in
the Personnel Department to handle all applications of
all prospective teachers should be implemented
promptly, the Department should promptly acknow-
ledge each application and otherwise reply to each
applicant.
This recommendation has not been fully carried out primarily because of a
lack of staff in the Personnel Department. A further obstacle to reform is
the absence of close liaison between the recruitment functions, hiring functions,
and the mechanics of processing applications.
5. That the Board of Education cease to assess the
personnel files of each of the officer candidates
The Board rejected this recommendation and continues to examine the files of
all officer candidates. It is important to note the similarity between Passow's
observation and one made by Dr. Strayer, namely, that the Board involved
itself too greatly in administrative detail and other matters which would
better
be left to the Superintendent of Schools.
6. That an Office of Staff Negotiations be established
for continued attention to the relationships between
the Board of Education, administrators, teachers
and other school employees affected by collective
bargaining. This office should not be part of the
Personnel Department, but should be on equal level
with it.
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A Department of Employer-Employee Relations was established with a director
and a small staff and has been in operation since the summer of 1968. This
office has been invaluable in handling the grievances brought by the Teachers'
Union and in negotiating sessions for new contracts with the Washington
Teachers' Union.
In Chapter III we discussed the Strayer Survey, the Model School
Division and the Passow Study and the recommendations of each proposal and
the extent to which each was carried out. In addition \vc attempted to analyze
those factors which compromised the implementation of each reform effort
and the impact of each on the school system.
In Chapter IV we shall discuss the Clark Plan and the Anacostia Project,
their origin, similarities in emphasis, but how each differed in the political
and social climate in which each was introduced and the impact each had upon
the system.
CHAPTER IV
A POSSIBLE REALITY - THE DESIGN FOR THE ATTAINMENT OF HIGH
ACADEMIC ACHIEVEMENTS FOR THE STUDENTS OF THE PUBLIC
ELEMENTARY AND JUNIOR HIGH SCHOOLS OF WASHINGTON,
D. C. - THE CLARK PLAN
On July 13, 1970, the School Board approved the Metropolitan Applied Research
Center (MARC) Report, calling for the attainment of high academic achieve-
ment for Washington's public school youngsters for educational excellence. Hoping
to avoid grimace posturing, MARC addressed itself to the substantive ingredients
of educational excellence as well.
In the area of curriculum, the report advocated specific educational content
and precise grade requirements that everyone understood; it recommended
that all the people involved - teachers, parents, and students, be directly
involved in establishing the standards and seeing that they are attained. Re-
garding teachers, Dr. Clark wrote that the profession, probably the most
important one in present-day society, should have dignity, status, and
the
objective support for dignity and status. The teachers should be strongly
motivated to perform at a high professional level.
At the meeting in which the Plan was adopted, Dr. Clark
was asked
about his expectations for the reacting mobilization
plan. Dr. Clark stated it
was their belief that the present retardation
was unnecessary and there was
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no rational or non-remedial reasons why that retardation should continue.
If the barriers to academic achievement are removed it is believed that the
average reading level of the children in the elementary and the junior high
schools of the Washington, D. C. Public Schools could be raised to national
norms within the first year of the program.
Dr. Clark went beyond that to say:
In subsequent years, sustaining the momentum, the
professional drive and performance, the norms for
reading in the Washington, D. C. System could go
beyond the national norms, in fact, the Washington,
D. C. Schools could create a condition of chaos in
terms of norms because it would be possible for their
children to function beyond what is considered now
adequate and which they did not believe to be adequate.
At the meeting Dr. Clark stated that:
There were three uncompromisable objectives of the
mobilization reading year which must be carried out
in each school. First, to remedy all present cases of
reading retardation among normal children in the
school so that each achieves at grade level or above;
second, to see that every normal child entering the
school system will function and continue to function
at or above grade level in reading and related skills;
third, to determine empirically through the attainment
of the first two objectives the highest level of reading
skills actually attainable by classes of normal children
without regard to their present age, I. Q. label, grade
level, or current national norms. In other words, new
and higher norms would be established.
2
1Minutes of the Fourteenth (Special Meeting) of the Board of
Education,
July 13, 1970, pp. 3-5.
Ibid.
,
pp. 29-30.
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In devising the curriculum which would be necessary to accomplish the
goals set forth in the Clark Plan, there were certain requirements set forth
by Dr. Clark. They were: (1) Designation of clear, specific and high standards
of what the system expects normal children to learn at each grade level and
the communication of these expectations to every child, every teacher and
every parent; (2) the establishment of system-wide minimum floors of achieve-
ment in content learning and skill mastery appropriate to the age and grade of
normal children and that these expectations be adhered to and obtained from
each child; (3) encouragement of flexibility, creativity, and imagination in the
teacher's choice of curriculum beyond the minimum curriculum content and the
minimum expectations of achievementl (4) provision of immediate success with
reward and reinforcement to facilitate the learning and skill mastery for each
child.
Other areas of the Clark Plan which generated controversy had to do with
teacher requirements. Dr. Clark specified:
The teacher must have adequate professional training
in behavioral development diagnosis, remediation and
familiarity with a variety of methods and materials in
order to assure his own competence and confidence.
Continued training and professional support on the job
must be provided to teachers in ways which are con-
sistent with personal and professional dignity.
The expectations for teacher achievement like the
expectations for student achievement must be clear,
specific, challenging, and attainable.
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Materials used in the initial and earty stages must be
stimulating and specifically oriented toward the sequen-
tial development of reading skills, for example, the
repeated association of the visual stimulus of the
letters of the alphabet and combination of letters with
specific sounds.
The natural curiosity and interest of children can be
constructively exploited to involve the children as active
participants in the excitement and exhiliration which
are possible in the process of learning to read. 0
Dr. Clark rproposed differentiated staffing, a four rank stage progressing
from resident teacher to staff or experienced or certified teacher to senior
teacher and finally to master teacher. Each of the requirements, skills and
functions of the four ranks was spelled out. The master teacher was equated
with a full professor at the university level. Salary formulas commensurate
with teacher rank were proposed although no exact figures could be set forth
since this would require legislation and approval by the Congress after a salary
schedule could be agreed upon and submitted by the Board of Education to the
Mayor and City Council. However, the formula system would make it possible
for teachers to continue their professional development and encourage them to
make contributions within the teaching profession itself.
The administration quickly moved to implement the Clark Plan. The
first structure proposed by the Acting Superintendent consisted of two senioi
staff members from the administration and a Howard University professor
2The Plan also called for a mathematics mobilization team with
the same
kinds of requirements: upgrading teacher skills, and establishing
minimum
Floors
.
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working with staff members from MARC who were to develop the minimum
Floors, the reading mobilization teams and those elements of the plan which
should be operational by September.
However, before plans could materialize at all, the Washington Teachers'
Union made known its opposition by issuing the following statement:
The Washington Teachers' Union condemns the
action taken by the Board of Education on Monday,
July 13, 1970 as another example of the callous
contempt displayed toward the students, staff, and
the community of the D. C. Public School System.
In its hasty adoption of the report "A Possible
Reality" the Board has committed a criminal act
in compromising the public that it has found the
magic formula that could cure the ills which plague
the school system. 4
The Union denounced the action by declaring it a violation of the Board's own
procedures and a flagrant violation of the agreement with the Board of Education
which was ratified in January, 1969 and was effective until June, 1971. The
Union took issue with the Clark Plan for many reasons, the chief one being
that the Union realized at the outset that the plan gave hopes to children and
parents that were impossible to fulfill within the time span suggested. Foi
too long parents had had their hopes and aspirations raised only to find them
dashed when the results were tallied.
The proposal was geared to standardized tests as a means of
measuring
pupil achievement and teacher effectiveness. Since standardized
tests are
4Paper prepared by Mr. William Simons, Executive
Director of the
Washington Teachers' Union, for specific use in this
Dissertation.
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normalized on a white middle class population, it was felt that this means of
measuring the achievement of a predominantly black student population would
have been invalid from the beginning. Furthermore, if teacher performance was
to be based on test results, it would follow that the children would be taught
in order to insure continued employment for the teacher.
Another aspect which had dubious validity to teachers was the emphasis
on competition. Pupils’ scores were to be posted in every classroom and in
the principal's office. Study after study has shown the debilitating effects
on pupils and teachers when results of unreliable group test scores have been
revealed. Arthur Combs of the University of Florida exposed the fallacy of
competition in his article "The Myth of Competition. " And Dr. Clark himself
had only a year before soundly denounced competition in colleges and universi-
ties*. ^
The Proposal had other shortcomings; it assumed that all changes
necessary could have been accomplished by the opening of school when the
persons affected were not even on duty prior to the opening of school. It
advocated ignoring the language patterns which many students used to communi-
cate, with Dr. Clark stating that the so-called Black English should be
stopped
at the school door. In effect, Dr. Clark was suggesting to teachers
that they
reject students who do not use standard English. This recommendation
was
in direct conflict with studies from many linguistics groups
that have demon-
°Ibid.
,
p. 73.
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strated that non-standard English can be used effectively in developing standard
English patterns. ^
The Union did agree with Dr. Clark that there exists widespread re-
tardation in reading and arithmetic in the inner schools of our large urban
centers. It also agreed that the prevalent theories seeking to explain this
under-achievement were basically fallacious, that Black children can learn if
educators deal with the fact of their oppression, and that Black children are
normal, but have had abnormal experiences in a racist society.
Finally, the Union agreed that there were many effective methods for
teaching reading skills. The Union indicated that what happens in a school
before and after the reading lesson has as much if not more to do with how well
a child learns to read than the reading lesson itself. The total climate of the
school, the relationship between and among the administrators, teachers,
students, parents and community, and most importantly the extent to which
the child perceives he is respected and has some control over what
happens
to him - all these affect the reading program. The changes required go far
beyond mere organizational shifts.
However, even though the Union and Dr. Clark started from the
same
basic premises, the conclusions reached were far different. The
Union
suggested that instead of a reading mobilization there
should be a mobilization
on the teaching of children; children fail to learn
to read not because of too
6
Ibid.
,
p. 73.
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little teaching but because of too much teaching, too much organization, too
much regimentation, too much conformity, too much stress on law and order,
too much bureaucracy, and too much authoritarianism.
The teachers of the School District goaded by the Union, pursued a course
of action which all but killed the program. Their first action was to disrupt
the testing schedule. Almost half of the teachers refused to administer the
initial reading test in September 1970. Their refusal led to an all night
bargaining session with the Board of Education which culminated in an agree-
ment allowing the testing to proceed. However, the teachers won an important
psychological victory. They put themselves on record trying to save the
community from the victimization of an ill-conceived program as the teachers
viewed the plan.
The Teachers' Union agreed that effective programs must be developed
by all parties concerned. Simons pointed out that the School Board adopted
the Clark Plan four days after it had been made public. No public hearing had
taken place; and Simons had spoken to one of Clark's stafl for only 45 minutes
before the Plan was issued. Simons argued that teacher involvement was
imperative, and that if teachers weren't involved, they would sabotage the plan.
Clark's representative asked whether the Union would sabotage a plan
that was
good for the children. Simons responded, "Yes, if we are not involved.
What
is good for children is not going to be purchased at the
price of dignity foi
adults. If we are going to be professional, wo arc going
to be involved in what
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affects us."7
By the time the new Superintendent took office sides had been chosen.
As expected, many parent groups had endorsed the Clark Plan. The city-wide
Congress of Parents and Teachers praised it for emphasizing reading and
although the group too no position on Clark's proposal for salary differentials,
it favored some form of recognition for outstanding service by teachers.
It may seem incredible, but during this raging debate-controversy, the
incumbent Superintendent's 40-man task force of union representatives, citizens
and administrative staff reviewed the work of the task forces set up by the
Acting Superintendent after which the Superintendent put into operation the
machinery to implement the Clark Plan. Committees were quietly going about
the business of developing minimum floors; workshops for principals were
0
being set up to explain how schools would be organized to carry out the Clark
Plan; reports were being reviewed by various teacher committees, and in
effect schools and the school administration were attempting to carry out the
mandate of the Board of Education.
The underlying and deep-seated conflicts and resentments remained.
They were exacerbated by an anticipated Court ruling. The Washington Post
editorial of September 13, 1970, described the confusion;
The D. C. Public Schools are now being buffeted by two
plans, each of which may be put into effect within the
current school year. First is the Clark Plan, this
7 Washington Post
,
September 10, 1970.
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program modestly titled, A Possible Reality, has two
major thrusts: (1) emphasis on developing reading
skills in the primary grades, and (2) the introduction
of Differentiated Staffing wherein teachers will receive
different ranks in salaries (much like college faculties)
as well as duties. A key element in the staffing plan is
that promotion - and hence salary and responsibility -
be based in large part on student performance. Each
teacher's eligibility for higher rank would be strongly
influenced by his students' test scores.
The second hurricane heading up the coast toward the
District is the promised new J. Skelly Wright Decision.
In 1967, Judge Wright held that the D. C. schools must
be run on the basis of real equality. Julius Hobson in a
recent suit has charged that Wright's earlier ruling has
not been enforced and that variations in expenditures per
pupil in different schools is prima facie evidence of
continued unequal educational treatment.
. .
If the Clark
Plan were implemented along with the Wright order, the
schools with the best achievement records would lose
non-salary funds while the schools which perform most
poorly would gain funds to bring their expenditure levels
up to the average.
Needless to say, these two plans are incompatible. If
Judge Wright rules that District Schools must equalize
expenditures, the implementation of the Clark Plan would
be an unmitigated disaster. Teachers would be striving to
raise their salaries through pupil achievement while
principals will be striving to hold achievement levels
down. If too many teachers in one school building succeed,
salaries will rise and principals will have to either transfer
some of their best teachers or do without books , heat, or
window repairs. The two plans are incompatible because
they are derived from entirely different notions about what
is wrong with the schools. ®
A little time soothed some of the emotional outcry generated by the
Clark Plan. While the Superintendent, Union and members of the admini-
8Two Major School Plans May be Incompatible , September 13, 1970,
Washington Post
,
Robert W. Hartman.
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stration were working on the plan, the threatened teacher walk-out was called
off. The Washington Afro-American in an article on October 17, 1970, de-
scribed the changing climate:
The stalemate divided the Washington community
into two camps for and against the plan. There were
loud supporters on both sides, but the silent ones
found that the latent threat in such a conflict en-
danger the children's education. Community
leaders got both of the parties to the negotiation
table. That led to a truce between the Board and
the Union. Both agreed to set up a joint Union-
Board Committee to explore amicable means to
implement the Plan eliminating its controversial
and questionable aspects. 9
About this time, the Superintendent expressed his intention to set up a
twelve-man community advisory committee to advise him on implementing
the Design for Academic Excellence called for in the Clark Plan. Scott
stressed that the new advisory council would in no way supersede his
responsibility as chief administrative officer of the school system. He added
that if the reviewing process of any report were delayed within the advisory
council, he would make disposition of the matter himself without benefit or
recommendation from the council. In addition to its eight citizen members,
the council was comprised of four members of the administrative staff. The
chairman was the Associate Superintendent of Instruction.
Over the first few months of the school year different contentions
were
being made. The Superintendent consistently declared that the Clark
Plan was
9
' Afro-American , October 17, 1970.
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being carried out, but that modification and time were needed. According to
Dr. Scott, the schools needed reorganizing; they had to gear up for such a
massive assault on reading and mathematics retardation. Dr. Clark on the
other hand, continued to stress that his Plan was being watered down,
compromised, and, in many ways, being done away with. And, on the school
scene were those teachers and administrators, both at the building and central
office levels who were working to develop and carry out the Clark Plan.
Finally, on November 21, 1970, Dr. Clark charged that Superintendent
Scott had abandoned his reading plan. The story was reported in the Washington
Post as follows
:
Psychologists Kenneth B. Clark said yesterday that
Washington School Superintendent Hugh J. Scott has
totally abandoned Clark's Reading Mobilization Plan
which was adopted at a city school Board meeting in
July. Clark stated the Superintendent is returning
the schools to the usual pattern of inefficiency and
retardation. He added, now it is up to the people of
Washington and the School Board; they must either
say they accept this abandonment or they will make
other arrangements for getting someone else to
implement this plan since the Superintendent says he
cannot. ^
The Washington Daily News reported a follow-up story:
D. C. Superintendent Hugh J. Scott will meet in closed
session with the District School Board tomorrow to
answer a lot of questioning about his progress in
carrying out the Kenneth Clark Reading Plan and demand-
ing that he report directly to Dr. Clark and to the
•^Washington Post
,
November 21, 1970.
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Metropolitan Applied Research Center of which Dr.
Clark is President. The letter which the School
Board sent to Dr. Scott last week after Dr. Clark
complained that his Plan must be accepted as written
or he will peddle it elsewhere, directs Dr. Scott to
outline your assessment of normality and charged him
with apparent equivocation in regard to testing.
Finally, the Washington Daily News on November 26, 1970 reported:
Superintendent of Schools Hugh J. Scott emerged a
clear winner today in his dispute with the District
School Board over the speed with which he is carrying
out the Clark Reading Plan in the District elementary
and junior high schools. The Board supports the
administrative position School Board President Anita F.
Allen said after a long meeting with Dr. Scott yesterday.
There will be major expeditious changes in the class-
room. The Board looks forward to his, Dr. Scott's,
implementation of the Reading program. The statement
ends, at least temporarily, an argument which began
when Kenneth Clark, author of the Reading Plan,
publicly criticized Dr. Scott for failure to act to achieve
its goals. 12
Weeks later on December 10, 1970, the Washington Post reported that:
Psychologist Kenneth B. Clark, author of Washington
School System 's Reading Mobilization Plan, has re-
signed as a paid consultant to the city School Board.
But in a letter released yesterday Clark promised that
he and his staff would continue to work indefatigabiy to
help those who want the Reading Plan carried out. In
reply School Board President Anita F. Allen wrote that
she is counting on Clark's promise to continue to help
us. Mrs. Allen said in an interview that the Board still
intends to have the Plan carried out.
13
1
^Washington Daily News , Mary Lineback, "Scott to Defend Clark
Reading
Plan, " November 24, 1970.
12
Washington Daily News , "Scott Wins Showdown,
" Mary Lineback,
November 26, 1970.
13Washington Post , December 10, 1970.
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Soon thereafter a full-time Clark Plan coordinator was named by the
Superintendent to carry out the Clark Plan and see that necessary steps are
taken on the school level.
By spring, mobilization teams were operational in all schools;
heterogeneous grouping had been established, minimum floors in reading and
mathematics had been issued to all teachers; workshops had been set up, and
the Superintendent had issued an eighty page report detailing the start that had
been made on the Clark Plan. But still the controversy raged as to whether
the Superintendent was truly implementing the Clark Plan as designed or not.
One of the issues that had not been satisfactorily resolved was hetero-
geneous grouping. Teachers pleaded with the Administration to narrow the
gap in learning abilities in their classes. The Superintendent responded by
promising that no more than a 2. 2 achievement differential would prevail in
any class. This action brought cries from several sources that the city
schools were returning to the "track” system. It appeared that the controversy
surrounding the Clark Plan would never die down.
The Washington Post on April 20, 1972, in an article entitled, The
Clark Plan Two Years Later: Between Possibilty and Reality" reviewed the
Plan from the standpoint of its progress two years later. It included inter-
views with teachers, principals, Dr. Scott and Dr. Clark and
analyzed what
had been called for in the Plan. Dr. Scott summed up his reactions by
claiming that too much had been expected. In addition, he stated
that:
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The plan came from the Board and that was something
almost improper.
. .
You don't change a major school
system as large as the D. C. Public Schools by adopting
a plan in isolation from those who have got to implement
it; that was a mistake.
Somehow every other week I had to keep issuing a state-
ment that 1 had supported the Academic Achievement
Project. I support it in terms of implementing it in
ways that I thought were sound. That was my responsi-
bility, not the Board's.
What you must keep in mind, the Plan did not spell out
any specific things in detail. It offered a whole lot of
nice things you should do. Well there are problems and
we're working on them. I get rather disturbed by
people who can come up with a plan saying a lot of nice
things that are going to happen and not really spell out
some specifics about how things relate. That's been my
job and I have been criticized for that and that's rather
foolish.
Read some of the directives that I have sent out to the
field then tell me that I don't care. 1 laught at these
people who criticize, maybe some people are saying I
am not doing everything I could in terms of what they
think I could be doing, but it is utter foolishness to state
that I am not doing something to try to promote academic
achievement.
Dr. Clark on the other hand, summed up his position two years later
as follows:
There are some ingredients of the Plan being implemented
piecemeal as there must have been in some of the schools
before there was a Plan. We said it was a total package;
we put great emphasis on the totality of the effort. What's
there now is like going out and looking at five
bones and saying it's a dinosaur.
“Washington Post, "The Clark Plan Two Years Later: Between
Possibility and Reality, April 20 , 11172,
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Scott is right when he says there never has been a
Clark Plan in the schools. There is nothing wrong
with the elements of the Plan, but they are incomplete
without the kind of committed leadership that is needed
for this to take roots and spread.
The selection of Scott as Superintendent removed the
possibility of there being a grasp of the need to have a
plan on a city-wide basis and to have the kind of
psychological support that can only come from the top
leadership. He emphasized what was difficult and
what couldn't be done. On the basis of his preoccupation
with all that was impossible, the Plan didn't have a
chance.
I haven't washed my hands of the Plan. That would
mean I had washed my hands of the kids. We will try
to find some way to put pressure on the Board and the
Bureaucracy. There is a need for parent and community
pressure, some sort of group ombudsman in the schools
and we will play a role as a catalyst in trying to get such
a group off the ground.
Right now there are these pieces of the Plan operating
in the larger atmosphere of negativism and confusion and
I just don't think they can work in it. The possible
exception is if a particular school operates in spite of
this and build its own climate. We know that's possible,
but that's not what the Plan was about. We were trying
to spread things that had been going on here in selected
schools to the whole school system.
There is absolutely no such thing as the Clark Plan in
the schools. I am glad the Superintendent laughs at
critics; I am glad he can laugh at anything; I can't
lauo-h at the fact these kids are no better off now than
two years ago.
Whether the Plan is working or not largely depends on the school
and
the personnel of the individual school in which it is being
operated. Its effect
15
Ibid.
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in the Model School Division was discussed by William Raspberry:
If you haven't heard angry shrieks from the Cardozo
Model School Division over implementation of the
Clark Reading Mobilization Plan it is because the
Model School Division has already implemented much
of what Clark proposed.
The results may be instructive; consider the 1969-
1970 reading test results - 4th graders at ten of the Di-
vision's administrative units showed gains over the
previous year. The other two declined but one of them
by only one point. Two of the model schools scored
at or above the national norm; two others were a single
point below that norm; all but one of the twelve equalled
or surpassed the city norm for reading.
What happened in the Model School Division that was
different? First, it may be useful to point out what
was not different.
Model School Division Schools had no extra money or
facilities beyond what was available to other schools
in the city nor were the children from privileged homes.
A recent survey taken in connection with Hobson's court
challenge to allocation of school funds shows that
Cardozo comprises the poorest population group in the
city.
What was different was that the Model School Division
had decided five years ago to do something about
teaching children to read.
The result of that decision was something very much
like what Dr. Kenneth Clark has proposed for the
whole school system; a pooling of resources, involve-
ment of parents, optimum use of reading specialists
and perhaps most important, training of teachers in the
teaching of reading.
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What all this suggests is that the Clark Plan can work
if individual teachers will try to make it work. 16
What Factors Compromised Implementation o.f the Clark Plan
In implementing the Design for Academic Achievement proposed and
adopted by the school system in the District of Columbia, a considerable
amount of data has been collected from principals, administrative personnel,
and representative teachers at workshop sessions. Basically many school
staff members at the building level realize that the solutions to basic problems
in the school must involve a rather comprehensive rethinking of organization,
power and authority relationships. In summary form, the problems described
at building levels in the District of Columbia Public Schools cluster in five
major areas, four in the area of organization and management.
1. The Principal’s Role . In general, as the principal
views his role, he lacks authority to implement
programs, to reprimand and correct teacher be-
havior; to have a voice in teacher selection or
decision-making about educational programs and
major educational policies. He has no control over
the actual reward system in the schools, is devoid
of authority over his actual budget, is not supported
by sufficient staff and help for administrative duties,
and lacks authority over personnel who come from
other school departments or central sources.
2. Procurement. Budget and Management of the Local
Buildings. Ordering procedures are described as
cumbersome. A long delay exists between the time
of ordering supplies and actual delivery. The system
16William Raspberry, ’’That Clark Plan and How to Do It.
" Washington
Post, September 29, 1970.
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for maintenance and general support service is
inadequate.
3. Communication. Formal avenues of information
exchange don't work. Policies are made and
communicated to personnel by the press. Inter-
personal communication is poor; training for
staff to improve communication is not supported
adequately. The concept that teachers, admini-
strators, and staff must continue to learn through-
out their time of service in education is not
accepted.
Decision making. Programs for individual buildings
are not developed by people involved in implementing
the program, but are devised from rather sketchy
guidelines which are standardized throughout the
city. Mechanisms have yet to be devised whereby
buildings can participate in defining their own needs
and solutions. In the area of decision making,
principals are unsure of their own power, and
consequently transfer their insecurity to teachers.
Policy-making efforts of the Board and Super-
intendent do not regularly make use of input from
buildings, principals, teachers or students.
5. Classroom Instruction . The standards, guidelines
and procedures for the grouping of children and
for assessing their needs and strengths are de-
veloped at upper levels without the involvement of
classroom personnel.
The above solutions proposed by teachers, principals and administrative
personnel accept the existing organizational structure and system. However,
if one takes into account what has been learned about educational change in the
last ten years he will conclude that limited intervention at the levels of
administrator and teaching will produce only very limited and unsatisfactory
results.
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In large measure, The Clark Plan is failing because there was no dynamic
intei action between experts and theorists in the field and practitioners and
implementers of the program at the teaching and learning level. In the earliest
stages of any educational program, the analysis and understanding of the
problem and the eventual solution proposed must involve all people who will
share information, responsibility and action in the project. Had these pro-
cedures been followed, it is possible that much of the insecurity of the teachers
concerning differentiated staffing, differences in salary and accountability
would have dissipated.
It is still questionable whether the school system had in hand the
resources to carry out the Plan. The high costs of testing, new materials,
and staff development worked against the successful implementation of the
Clark Plan. Obviously, too, the transition of leadership also created a problem
since the Plan was approved under the administration of an acting super-
intendent and the job of implementing the program was taken on by a new
superintendent two months after the Plan had been approved.
The Anacostia Project
One of the chief reasons for the failure of the Clark Plan was the lack
of involvement of teachers, administrators, citizens and all who have a stake
in the public schools. Yet the Anacostia Project with its total involvement of
a community, citizens, teachers, administrators, federal and local officials
)
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is scheduled to be terminated as of August 1972. The Office of Education, in
a letter to the Director of the Project dated October 13, 1971 stated that the
decision had been made to terminate the Anacostia Project because the venture
"has been unable to successfully document that it has made significant progress
towards the fulfillment of its original objection. It was added that there is
18
"no evidence of capacity that needed changes could be made. "
The Board of Education approved the Anacostia Project on September
18, 1968. In presenting his report and recommendation for approval to the
Board, the Superintendent pointed out that:
The proposal was in response to President Johnson's
request to Congress for ten million dollars to develop
a demonstration of excellence in urban education in
Washington, D. C. The proposal has involved the
joint efforts of professional educators, citizens and
students of the Anacostia area. j9
The Superintendent explained how the professional educators, citizens, and
students worked together to assess the educational needs of their community.
He expressed his appreciation for the time and efforts that participants
devoted to this proposal and stated that the finished project has his whole-
hearted support. The Superintendent further stated that it was his hope and
belief that Congress would provide the requested funds for this project so that
the
l7
The Anacostia Project, Some Impediments to Its Successful Operation
and Fulfillment of Its Goal, by William Rice, Project Director, prepared
for
the writer.
18Ibid.
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Ibid.
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’’Anacostia Community might realize the benefits of the program they have
proposed and thereby serve as a model of excellence in urban education for
the entire nation.
The approval of the project by the Board of Education climaxed six weeks
of intensive work during the summer of 1968. hi those two summer months
an amazing partnership evolved. For the first time, there was a real
cooperative effort in the planning process; citizens, professionals and youth
sat and worked together to develop a program for the benefit of the child and
other members of the community.
The traditional planning model whereby highly qualified and competent
professionals are brought together to plan for a community was bypassed.
Such models, it was agreed, however well designed, foster exclusion and
denials; the community, by not being involved in the planning of its own programs,
is denied the right to participate. By being denied participation, citizens are
denied the opportunity to increase their awareness of the options available
and to grow through their exposure to alternatives.
The model chosen by the Anacostia Project, a model of community
involvement in the planning process, provided a viable and workable alterna-
tive. As a result, the community emerged as a legitimate partner in school
involvement and involvement is not only seen as a prerequisite for the
success
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of the educational system, but as a ’’fundamental right. ” As President
Johnson said in his March message to Congress, "Washington's 150,000 school
children and their parents must also be able to exercise one of their most
fundamental rights; they must have a voice which can be heard in the operation
21
of their school system.
The Anacostia document is symbolic of that voice: Readers may be
accustomed to proposals which elaborate more in detail the step by step
procedures for developing programs, but it is safe to say that there are few
documents which represent the community involvement represented here. The
document is not a technical address, but rather the voice of the spirit of the
Anacostia community. Residents played the central role; the school admini-
stration, a background role. The administrators attempted to use this
knowledge and experience to facilitate the efforts of the participants. Tradi-
tional leadership roles had to be changed to meet the new demands being made.
The Anacostia Community School Project was designed for ten schools
in an area of the city suffering severe school overcrowding. The area
contained about fifty per cent of the city's public housing. Pupil performance
ranked at the bottom third of the nation. The people of Anacostia had long
felt neglected, both because vital programs were rarely brought to their
section of the city and because they were in fact cut off geographically from
the rest of the city by the Anacostia River.
21
Ibid.
101
The immediate task facing the staff was how to involve large numbers of
Anacostia residents and educational personnel in planning and thinking about
Anacostia's needs and the kinds of proposals to recommend for funding. A
one-day meeting was planned open to all Anacostia citizens interested in having
the scope of the project explained. The meeting provided a forum for the
discussion of the educational needs of the area. The meeting was held in a
neighborhood church rather than a school; this at the suggestion of some
community residents who explained the community's alienation from the
school.
The meeting was a general one which featured speakers from the Office
of Education, the Ford Foundation, the D. C. Public Schools and operational
school community projects. The conference thus provided a broad framework
for those attending. It further provided the occasion for the selection of
some members of the Anacostia Community Planning Council. The council,
subsequently a 46-member body broadly representing the Anacostia Community,
was chosen to assure continued community participation in the preparation of
a proposal. The conference also provided two other important elements of
the planning process: (1) identification of the educational needs of the
Anacostia community, improved relevant curriculum, expanded community
involvement, greater teacher involvement with the community, expanded
counseling and psychological services, job opportunities and placement, more
class space; and (2) active involvement of substantial numbers of
Anacostia
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residents and school personnel. Subsequent to the conference, a massive
eifort was launched to bring many residents to the planning workshop which
would start on July 1.
The numbers and diversity of people attending the July 1 workshop at
Ballou High School were impressive: 280 people, approximately 4G.7 per
cent parents and residents of Anacostia, 37. 8 per cent teachers in the
Anacostia schools, and 15. 5 young adults and school age youth of the Anacostia
area. The Washington Teachers' Union had worked very closely in the planning-
stage of the Anacostia Project and gave its full support and endorsement to
the teachers who participated in the planning and the workshop.
The 280 workshop participants rapidly divided themselves into four main
task forces each dealing with one area: early childhood education, elementary,
secondary, and adult education. All task forces were composed of both teachers
and community people, and all divided into sub-groups to consider specific
areas of concern such as program development, student skills and service,
staff development, communit}' participation, administration and organization.
Thus, there existed a task force base structure for formulating program goals
for the experimental community school system. Another group, the ad hoc
community planning council became a task force devoted to insuiing lasting
community participation in the life of the project. Moreover, the youth who
participated as members of the various task forces assumed the responsibility
for designing programs for youth.
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The process of accumulating knowledge and sharing experiences were
fluid and varied. Special resource people and consultants were on hand to
advise groups and to help arrange meetings with other specialists.^ During
the course of the planning, outside consultants were brought in on a regular
basis to meet with the various task forces and the information they provided
often stimulated the participants to visit sites and programs in other parts
of the country. Such visits were encouraged, fluids were provided, and
participants went to cities as Boston, Philadelphia, New York and Flint,
Michigan. The Flint, Michigan Community School Program sent a team to
I
Anacostia to meet with the participants.
A typical day would see the entire institute assemble for a few minutes
to outline the day’s program. Participants would then divide into task forces
and work in sub-groups. All would reassemble at midday for a formal feed-
back session at which each task force leader would report. Although the
institute was scheduled toclose at one o'clock, the subgroup and task force
leaders often remained with the staff to plan and evaluate until late in the
afternoon. In addition, the Anacostia Community Council met late into the
night reviewing the day's occurences and helping to keep the task
force effort
in focus.
Youths wanted and achieved some independence. They chose not
to make
on-site visits with adult members of the group but went on their own
to see
22
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projects like New York's Street Academies. The youth group also decided to
formulate its own plans and ideas and then report back to the group as a whole
rather than participate in the task forces as members of the various sub-
interest groups.
In the final week of the institute the sub-groups hammered out their
proposals and had them costed. The early childhood task force submitted a
total package for a comprehensive early childhood program including pre-
natal care, early intervention using young adults as trainees, a child centered
curriculum for 3-5 year old children, full supportive services, and community
decision-making and participation in all aspects of the program. The elementary
task force proposed nine individual programs ranging from inservice training
for both teachers and the community to a program to keep the schools open all
day to provide programs for children and adults. The secondary education task
force proposed a twelve-point program geared to the betterment of school-
community relationships, the development of innovative curriculum reflecting
the character and needs of urban life, methods of improving school attendance,
and the formation of a structure which would provide greater program
flexi-
bility for teachers, thereby leading to increased creativity in
classroom
instruction.
The youth group developed seven programs ranging from sex
education
to data processing and vocational guidance. Youth
were also concerned with
improving teacher salaries, working conditions, and
inservice programs and
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in instituting Black history courses in the school.
The adult education task force, recognizing the manpower needs in
Anacostia proposed a training and employment program which would provide
adequate vocational preparation and training skilled end community persons to
work in the schools as paraprofessionals and trainers.
Most of the group urged the inclusion of Black history and culture in the
curriculum and special programs to improve reading. The Community Council
developed a design for community participation in the Anacostia Community
School Project.
Provided with costs and copies of the program, ideas developed by other
groups, each sub-group and task force, and finally the entire institute, was
able to determine program priorities. The institute then combined all programs
into an overall proposal, costed at about 15 million dollars, for submission to
the U. S. Office of Education.
The decision to exceed the President's call for a 10 million dollar program
was deliberate. The citizens decided that they wanted to demonstrate a compre-
hensive package, including a two million dollar health program for their
community. They therefore opted to present the full package rather than
scale their needs to a predetermined arbitrary figure.
In August, the proposed program ran into financial trouble. Word was
received that the Project would probably receive only one million dollars.
While the citizens made known their displeasure and disappointment, they also
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decided that one million dollars was more than they had had in the past, and
they intended to do the best they could with whatever they got, always of course,
fighting for additional funds.
There was no doubt about the President’s concern for the Project as many
project documents make clear, its origins were high in the Federal Government
and far from local initiative. Numerous papers housed in the Johnson Library
attest to the fact that in 1967 and 1968, White House aides and Federal education
officials spent a lot of time and effort trying to do something about the city
schools. One result was a community-controlled school district in Anacostia.
Despite substantial lobbying by White House aides, Congress voted only one
million dollars to start the Anacostia Project, instead of the ten million dollars
Johnson requested. Since 1969, another five million dollars has been spent
0
on the venture.
Using the one million dollars received from Congress, the Anacostia
Project placed its emphasis upon reading. Community people were trained
to become reading assistants in the classrooms (CRAs). The CRAs were
given courses at Federal City College where they were to receive an associate
in arts degree. The experiment also included a data processing course at
Ballou High School, a preschool program at the old Congress Heights Elemen-
tary School, Adult Education, and attempts to organize the community, with
each school being assigned a community organizer for this purpose. Each
school had its own community board; and a full board governed the entire
project.
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In October, the U. S. Office of Education, claiming that little had been
achieved, cancelled the Anacostia Project. No prior notice of dissatisfaction
with performance had been given by government officials. Indeed, evaluations
during the project's two-year operation noted that after overcoming problems
inherent in the process of community involvement, the project had begun to
deliver.
The reaction of the community was expectably strong and angry. As the
Washington Post reported,
Supporters of the community have protested vigorously,
arguing that since its inception the Project has been
shortchanged on money and .denied support from the
Office of Education. They say that while it has not done
all that it was supposed to, it has accomplished some-
thing; they contend that in a community with a history
of apathy, the Project needed more time to really dig
in. 23
William Raspberry, writing for the Post , stated his concern:
Among those even remotely interested in the Anacostia
Community School Project, I may be the only one who is
not utterly certain where the truth lies. The Federal
Office of Education which originally funded then killed
and then recently gave a temporary extension to the
experiment, is utterly certain that it wasn't working.
Community based leaders of the Project are just as
certain that it was working very well.
The community people cite gains in reading achievement
one to two grades above the city average with every
single one of the eleven schools posting scores above
the national big city average.
2
^Washington Post , December 12, 1971, "Anacostia Fights
ior Its
Beacon.
"
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The Office of Education officials say there has been no
measurable improvement in reading ability; that data
purporting to show such gains simply aren't valid. 24
At least one man who has been involved in the Project since the beginning,
William Anderson, Executive Director of the Frederick Douglas Center thinks
something more sinister than differing academic assessments is involved.
I think the problem is how the administration looks at how
to attack social problems.
First they start a pilot project to placate the community,
then they see to it that the pilot project fails. For
example, of the ten million dollars needed, we get one
million dollars.
If certain kinds of projects show signs of motivating
Black people to think for themselves, far too often
comes the arbitrary decision to cut them off, and since
no project is perfect, they can always find an excuse
to cut it off.*-'5
Anderson, hardly an objective critic, sees a kind of pattern in programs
that have been started for poor people (in the last five years especially). The
examples he cites includes the Ocean-Hill Brownsville School Project in New
York. When that experiment began to show results, he said, they legislated
redistricting which essentially killed the project. The same pattern he charges,
applied to fair employment programs, the neighborhood legal services, and
OEO community action programs. The Government simply does not intend for
24
William Raspberry, "The Anacostia School Project," The Washington
Post, Wednesday, November 17, 1971,
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the efforts of Black people to be successful.
Why did the Anacostia Project fail? Project Director, William Rice
discussed the reasons as he saw them.
1. Lack of Multi-Year Funding. At the end of the first
Fiscal Year, June 30, 1969, the officials of the
Project, those of the Office of Education and public
schools had no prior knowledge of whether the
Project would be continued during the next year, and
if so at what level of funding. Requests had gone
forward for a major increase from one million to
five million dollars for the next year. Plans had to
be held in abeyance for several months with the
Project's two partly funded programs operating on a
continuing resolution. When it was learned that
funding would remain the same for the second year,
this meant that little if any progress could be made
toward established goals. In fact, because of the
increases in pay which had occurred, and which had
to be absorbed from the grant, staff actually had to
be reduced.
2
.
Improper Placement of the Program with the Office
of Education
.
From the very beginning, the Project
faced a serious problem of accountability at the
Office of Education. Its funds were received from
the Bureau of Research under Title IV, while it was
being monitored and given technical assistance by
officers from ESEA, Title I. This unhappy and un-
pleasant arrangement was continued for two years.
When a change in administration and personnel was
effected, the Project was transferred to the Bureau
of Research, Title IV and management was assigned
to the Director of Experimental Schools. The Project,
however, did not fit the guidelines for this program
and it, therefore, was merely a detachment. As a
result, there was no project officer available to the
Project at the Office of Education (except on a
temporary assignment basis for a period of eight
months). This slowed down approval of proposals,
funding, and the day-to-day answering of questions
as they arose.
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3. Chang'es in Top Level Administration both at the
Office of Education and the D. C. Public Schools.
By the close of the second year, no one at the Office
of Education who had originally supported the Project
was still associated with it in any way. Even clerical
and administrative personnel had been changed. Also,
new top level administration in D. C. Schools had not
been urged to give preferred attention to the Project
(as had former staff members) in order to help insure
its success were in office. Therefore, although the
funding of the Project was short-termed, it was
necessary for it to wait its turn for services that had
to be provided by the System.
4 . Change in Educational Emphasis from Community Control
to Accountability
.
From the beginning of its ascendancy
as an idea for improving urban education, school systems
either feared or doubted that the community could do an
effective job of running as complex an organization as the
public schools. If schools were to be accountable,
officials resolved, then, they and not the community must
have control. The idea of community control ceased to
be popular in spite of any successes it might cite.
5. Bureaucratic Delay . When short term projects (with
year-to-year funding) have to wait four and five months
to have positions that have already been approved and
funded filled, programs naturally suffer. It is especially
difficult to find or keep competent staff under these
conditions. The long wait for instructional materials and
supplies, the lease of space for special programs cause
project officials to be accused of failure to hire needed
personnel and make available adequate supplies and
materials. Also, the poor accounting and reporting system
in the D. C. Schools failed to inform the Project of its
financial status with any regularity or accuracy. This
resulted in audit exceptions which were unavoidable.
6 . Lack of Sophistication on the Part of the Community in
Understanding the Complexities of School and Government
Operations. It was expected that many community parti-
cipants ""would not understand the complexities in school
and Government operations, such as procurement,
Ill
personnel, budget, etcetera. It. was also realized that
role definition would be an important issue that would be
difficult to deal with, but this it was thought would be
worked out to a great extent in proposed board training
workshops held in each of the neighborhood schools and
for the area board. Board members, however, soon
tired of so many workshops and many of the expected
problems had to be worked through as they occurred.
For example, it was the realization that board members
could not make themselves available to interview every
teacher all during the year that prompted the decision
that the director would be given this authority. Some
other similar powers the board would not relinquish;
this caused additional periods of delay in operation.
7
.
Lack of Agreement Among Major Participants on
Priorities for Goals. In the final analysis, a lack of
agreement as to what should be the proper goals and
what should be the priorities in attempting to reach
them was the direct reason for the project's
termination.
Certainly, the Anacostia Project did not fail because of a lack of involve-
ment at any level of community or government. The Project was called for
by the President of the United States; it had the support and backing of the
Commissioner of Education; it had the complete backing and support of the
Superintendent of Schools and the Board of Education, and the program without
doubt, was planned completely with the active participation of the
citizens,
teachers, and youth of the community concerned. The community exhibited
a tremendous amount of energy, enthusiasm, and effort in putting
the Anacostia
Project together. They considered the program an opportunity to gam
control
of the operation of their schools and to have a say in
what was taught, "’hen it
2G slatcrae„t prepared by the Director of the Anacostia
Community School
Project for the writer of this paper.
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was taught and how it was taught so that their children might benefit. And
the Board of Education cooperated with the community. For example, in
response to the overcrowded conditions in Anacostia schools, the Board gave
first priority to new school housing in the Anacostia area beginning in 1969-70.
The Project director pinpointed a major part of the trouble when he
talked about administrative problems. The staff members who were in office
at the project's inception are no longer around, and the new people coming in
did not share their commitment to the Project. Perhaps a lack of resources
was also a factor in the project's demise. Or perhaps it was the bureaucratic
structure which delayed supplies, materials, and hiring so that the momentum
and impact of the project were completely lost. Probably all of these factors
contributed to the failure of the Anacostia Project. But basically, once again,
the Project was an attempt at a piecemeal, bandaid operation when an entire
system is in need of reorganization and revitalization.
The whole educational system needs revamping.
The confusion existing is hardly credible, authority
and responsibility are horribly tied up with red tape;
the bureau-centered methods in use are entirely in-
adequate to the task. An attempt is made to manage
a large city school system by small town methods and
the result is disastrous. Educational conditions in
Washington from an administrative point of view are
among the worst to be found in any city in the Union
and the school system is behind that of cities of
elsewhere of equal size in the Union. 1 he superin-
tendency of the schools of Washington is generally
agreed as one of the most difficult and undesirable
positions of the United States. 27
1 13
While this comment was made by a superintendent of schools fifty years
ago, it has been restated in almost the exact words in the last decade by such
people as Dr. A. Harry Passow in his study Toward Creating A Model Urban
School, by Dr. Kenneth Clark in his recent 1970 proposal Toward A Possible
Reality
,
and by Dr. Hugh Scott, Superintendent of Schools, to the Board of
Education in February 1970.
.
Various strategies have been undertaken over the years to respond to such
indictments, most of them piecemeal and isolated attempts to effect change.
Curriculum and teaching have been tackled through the various surveys and
now the Clark Plan. Organization has been tackled through the sub-system
concepts suggested originally by President John Kennedy's Science Advisory
Committee in the form of the Model School Division. Community control has
been instituted within the Adams-Morgan and Anacostia Community School
Projects. The Innovation Team has been effective in staff training. Most
recently, Dr. Kenneth Clark charted a massive concentration on reading and
attempted by policy, politics, and charisma to force a system—wide confron-
tation with the failures of the system and the possibilities of changing it by
inducing personal accountability.
27 Comments made by Superintendent of Schools Frank W. Ballou in
1922, from the Encyclopedia of Education , edited by Dr. Paul Monroe,
Vol.
II, pp. 344-345.
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Yet the stark facts remain - in spite of these diverse well-intentioned
efforts, the school system is failing its students today just as it failed them
fifty years ago.
And in the face of the city's political and social
realities, it is, at the best, foolish to propose that
universities, planners, or any outside resources
can, in one fell swoop, reform and administer to all
of the ills of a public educative system in the federal
city.
With this rather bleak conclusion to the Anacostia story, the author will
attempt in Chapter V to summarize and isolate those factors which seem to have
the greatest impact upon the success or failures of attempts at educational
reform. Hopefully, the conclusions that come from this final analysis will in
some way help us to chart a better course towards reform of our schools in
urban settings.
28
Position paper on A Process for Creating New Organization and
Management of Learning by Mary Lcla Sherburne, March 15, 1971.
CHAPTER V
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS
In Chapter III, The Strayer Survey, the Model School Division, and the
Passow Study were reviewed in detail. The Clark Plan and the Anacostia
Project were analyzed in Chapter IV. Under consideration were these factors:
(1) the actual recommendations for reform; (2) the extent to which the
recommendations for reform were actually carried out; (3) how the recommen-
dations were compromised in the process of their implementation, and
(4) what the significant factors were in compromising the effectiveness of
each of the suggested reforms.
0
The Strayer Survey
As was pointed our earlier, Dr. Strayer's report is a review of, and
recommendations on, all phases of D. C. public school life - administration,
operation, maintenance of buildings and grounds, food services, school
buildings and school housing needs, and the financing of public school education.
In the report, Dr. Strayer made the following major recommendations:
1. That the Board of Education should reorganize its
procedures to guarantee that more adequate con-
sideration will be given to matters of major policy.
In other words, the Strayer Report was advocative
that the Board of Education be responsible for the
management and control ol the District school
system. Strayer wanted to free the hands of the
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Superintendent of schools to ta.ke care of the
administrative details - he wanted the
Superintendent and his staff to run the school
system.
2. That the Board of Education abolish its system
of operating through a committee structure. Dr.
Strayer felt strongly that the committee system
interferred with the operation of the Superintendent's
office and, indeed hindered the operation of the
Board of Education itself. He emphasized strongly
that the Board of Education should be a policy-
making body.
3. That the District’s administrative and supervisory
staffs should be reorganized so that function was
the paramount consideration, not position in the
hierarchy.
4. That the system undertake serious reform in the
administration of business affairs. Dr. Strayer
recommended that there be a great deal of built-
in flexibility in spending, planning, and the ability
to shift monies by the Board of Education to meet
emergencies. He suggested that the Board should
share those freedoms enjoyed by other cities in the
operation of their business affairs.
5.
That deficiencies in the area of special education be
overcome. In one of his strongest critiques, Dr.
Strayer highlighted four glaring inadequacies:
(a) the lack of a strong central clinic to which all
children needing special services could be referred;
(b) the lack of supervisory and advisory services
for
the physically and mentally handicapped; (c) an
inadequate budget for special education; (d) too many
untrained teachers serving in special education
programs.
6. That a strong program be devised
which would
develop an adequate system for financing the
public
school system of the District of Columbia.
Dr.
Strayer indicated the pressing need for
reform of
the District's system of taxation to
produce about
117
15 to 20 million dollars in additional revenue to
balance the District budget. Strayer wanted to
see an increase in the federal payment, changes
in the financing of the school building program
and the institution of a new system of fiscal control.
In large measure, the Strayer Survey was compromised by two realities
which are even more acute today: The cost of the reforms and the lack of
authority of the Board of Education and D. C. citizens to raise their own revenue
or to implement a report which was initiated, supervised, and funded by the
Congress of the United States. Actually, however as was pointed out earlier
in tills report, many of the recommendations handed down by Dr. Strayer were
carried out administratively; indeed, many recommendations that he made
are still in effect today even though they have undergone some modification.
Model School Division
The Cardozo High School area was conceived of as a project which would
saturate one inner city area with a variety of social and educational programs.
However, this effort was modified by the School Board. Acting upon the
recommendations of the Superintendent, the Board of Education decided to
embrace the idea of an experimental model sub-system which would be
instituted in the same inner city area that had been set aside for the saturation
effort by the planners of the poverty program.
From the beginning, the Model School Division was plagued with financial
problems, administrative organization, misunderstanding of program goals
and conflict between the advisory committee and the Board of Education
con-
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cerning the role each was to assume. Yet despite the problems and the wide-
ranging controversy sparked by the Program, it did make some important
inroads. Its successes: (1) the development of an effective staff development
technique - the Innovation Team, a group of highly skilled teachers who worked
with other teachers on a peer basis with no authority or power to rate or
evaluate performance. This technique was so successful within the Model
School Division that it is currently being used elsewhere in the District and
in other cities as well; ^ (2) the eclectic or combination approach to reading
instruction. Whenever possible, two or more programs have been combined
together and use has been made of supplementary materials; (3) Dr. Passow,
in his review of the school system, commended the Model School Division for
having developed an outstanding esprit-de-corps within its schools and for
having distributed new materials and used new methods of teaching students.
Dr. Passow indicated, "the Model School Division represented the closest thing
available in Washington to a system for initiating and testing ideas new to the
o
District School System. "
Indeed, the Model School Division did demonstrate that inner city class-
rooms can be alive and fresh and that teachers and parents and school officers
working together can plan programs and carry them out for the good of childien
1The Baltimore Model Cities Areas has developed an Innovation Team
now in its second year of operation.
^Passow, p. 377.
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(4) 1 he Model School Division proved beyond doubt thnt given continuing
opportunities to communicate with each other, teachers and principals can
work together in planning school programs and that this process would enable
each group to overcome feelings of suspicion and distrust. (5) The Model
School Division proved that the development and implementation of a good
program would encourage citizens of the community, teachers and citizens
from other parts of the city and from the surrounding area to attend workshops
and look at the materials, textbooks and other items being used in the program.
The success of the Model School Division was compromised by a number
of factors: (1) a lack of continuous funding which would have enabled the
Division to build on and plan new programs; (2) an existing bureaucratic
structure which did not lend itself to the need and desire to respond quickly to
problems; (3) an absence of funding fostered by the legal restrictions imposed
by the District of Columbia and Federal Governments; (4) the absence of a
mechanism for incorporating in the rest of the school system all that was
learned in the Model School Division; (5) a general misunderstanding and dis-
trust of the Model School Division, its goals and financing; (6) the school
system’s inability to accept a sectional, autonomous resources and
development
sub-unit: and (7) the system's lack of commitment to experimentation
and
innovation within the Model School Division.
There is a great deal to be learned from the history of the
Model School
Division. Through the study of its evolvement as a program
a number of
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educational observations become clear:
1. The unit of change for a school system is informal,
molded generally by society and larger systemic
forces than the classroom, the individual school
or the sub-system. The collective forces of
training and growth points within a subsystem
could not be maintained when decisions made at
higher and more comprehensive levels constantly
undermined the small subsystem. A model of
change focused exclusively on a subsystem, there-
fore, is not practical in view of the nature of the
overall system and societal wishes to have
decision-making affect all schools. The sphere
of influence of the Innovation Team in its initial
stages in 1966 was a subsystem in the Model
School Division. It is apparent in retrospect that
Federal and local decisions to equalize expenditures
across the schools; to redistribute black and white
teachers and students, and to focus educational efforts
on specific skills were all decisions which forced
mobility and spread out the expertise developed in
individual teachers by the Model School Division
.
experience.
2. The funding sources often determine who the clients
of particular programs will be. Titles I and IV of
ESEA, the general influence of federal policy and
programs dictated in the first and the final decree
who the client would be and in general the kinds of
solutions which might be provided for the client's
problems. These decisions were made, of course,
in the initial stages on the basis of economic and
social determinants. While economic and social
determinants do define the problems, they do not
necessarily provide the best definition of the units
or approach for encouraging improvements in education
which they purport to foster, hi other words,
school systems are not organized specifically to
deliver services or to improve only Title I schools.
They are organized as entire systems, and the
efforts to influence only a few schools invariably
fall into the same morass of problems related to
the whole system.
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3. Due to funding patterns, school organization and the
definition of tasks described above, most training and
development programs in schools are offered to
professionals and other people working within the school
system. The community's potential for supporting
and contributing to the change process in schools is
thereby radically limited because it lacks legitimate
access to training and to the elements creating real
growth. The lack of legitimate access in responsi-
bility of the community with regard to extending
change and information in education radically limits
its potential and real influence. It is not, and has
not been considered, the legitimate role of the school
to influence and train any people other than pro-
fessionals or those who are connected with the schools
in some formal way.
4. The bias of funding and development programs in
schools is toward introducing piecemeal solutions,
packages, and new methodologies into old systems,
rather than changing those systems. This is built
on the assumption that a system functions as a
mechanical model and new parts can be substituted for
malfunctioning ones. This interpretation runs
counter to an organic theory of systems which re-
cognizes that whole systems grow and that the intro-
duction of one new part influences others. The people
are the basic unit of the system and should therefore
be the target of change. It is their competence in
utilizing and distributing resources which should be
the fundamental concern and the objective of the
primary interventions.
5. The operational inadequacy in planning and expenditure
procedures of school systems insures that programs
will be devel oped - in time and in function - behind
the needs of people and society. It is now clear that
the new learnings and informal power which the
Innovation Team's new programs and dynamic
approaches within the system were able to give could
not be supported by the day-to-day procedures of the
system. ^
3Mary Lcla Sherburne, "Learning Advisory Exchange, " 1971, pp. 6-7.
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As Toffler says in Future Shock:
What passes for education today in even our best
schools and colleges is a hopeless anachronism.
Parents look to education to fit their children for
life and the future. Teachers warn that lack of an
education will cripple a child's chances in the world
of tomorrow. Government, ministry, churches, the
mass media all exhort young people to stay in school,
insisting that now as never before one's future is
almost wholly dependent upon education. Yet, for all
this rhetoric about the future our schools face back-
ward toward a dying system rather than forward to the
emerging new society. Their vast energies are applied
to cranking out industrial men; people tooled for
survival in a system that will be dead before they are.
To help avert future shock we must create a super
industrial educational system and to do this we must
search for our objectives and methods in the future rather
than in the past.
^
In my opinion, The Model School Division and the Innovation Team offered the
best hope for the kind of dynamic, futuristic planning called for by Toffler.
Toward Creating A Model Urban School System
Unlike the Strayer Survey, the Passow Study was initiated by the Board
of Education and the Superintendent in cooperation with the community. In
the beginning, it was requested that an outside consultant group be
brought
in to evaluate the four-track curriculum which was in effect during
this period.
However, this modest effort was expanded into a study of the whole
District of
Columbia Public School System. This study was undertaken by Dr.
Passow
llvin Toffler, Future Shock, New York: Random House,
1970
123
from Teachers College, Columbia University. The study was conducted by
thirty-three task forces and covered every facet of the school system and its
operations and personnel. The common goal was to propose those changes
which would affect maximum improvement in the D. C. Public Schools in order
to insure quality education for all. In contrast to the Strayer Survey, the process
carried out in the Passow Study, as far as can be determined, represented the
most extensive involvement and cooperation in the analysis and the proposed
rebuilding of a school system ever undertaken by any school community in any
large city. This is in contrast to the Strayer Survey which saw little or no
concentrated effort of implementation.
Some of Dr. Passow's recommendations discussed in this paper were:
(1) The school system should decentralize and the decentralization process
should be done in such a manner as to insure the greatest possible success for
the reorganization; (2) An administrative reorganization should take place in
the Superintendent's Office. A Vice Superintendent should be in charge of the
day-to-day operations and the administration should be separated into five major
divisions; (3) A Program-Planning-Budgeting-System should be developed and
utilized, and the process for developing the budget should be placed in the new
department of Planning, Research and Innovation; (4) A complete reorganization
of the District's Special Education programs should be undertaken. This
recommendation was similar to Dr. Strayer's 25 years earlier; (5) A Bilingual
School should be created to include the standard curriculum in English
and
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Spanish; (6) A strong office of Staff Development should come into being. Dr.
Passow recommended that 15 to 20 per cent of teachers’ time be devoted to
staff development activities during the regular school day; (7) The school system
should embark upon a massive recruitment program to attract new teachers and
the latest recruitment techniques including attrative brochures should be used
in this effort; (8) A major reorganization of the Personnel Department should
be accomplished, including the establishment of an office of staff negotiations
so that there would be constant and continued attention given to the relationship
between the Board of Education, teachers, administrators and other school
employees affected by collective bargaining.
A Possible Reality; The Design for the Attainment of High
Academic Achievement for the Students of the Public
Elementary and Junior High Schools In Washington^
D. C. - The Clark Plan
The chief goals of the Clark Plan were to raise the achievement levels
of
elementary students in reading and mathematics with heavy emphasis
on the
teaching of reading and mathematics and the testing of achievement
through
standardized tests. In large measure the Clark Plan is
failing because there
was no dynamic interaction between experts and theorists
in the field and
practitioners and implemented of the program at the teaching
and learning
levels. This is in essence the opposite of the
technique proposed by the Mod
School Division and several other programs
which involved all who are to have
a hand in implementing the program at the
beginning. Had these procedures
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been followed in the Clark Plan, some of the problems may have been avoided
or dissipated,,
It is still questionable whether the school system had in hand the resources
to carry out the plan. The high cost of testing, new materials, and staff
development worked against successful implementation of the Clark Plan.
Obviously, too, the transition of leadership also created a problem since the
plan was approved under the administration of an acting superintendent and the
job of implementing the program was taken on by a new superintendent two
months after the plan had been approved.
The Anacostia Project
The Anacostia Project was unique because it was called for by President
Johnson in his Budget of March 1968 Message and was supported by high officials
in local and federal government. Despite the massive involvement in writing
the Anacostia Project by citizens, youth, teachers, members of the teacheis
union, and representatives from all segments of the community, the
Project
was judged a failure and is to be terminated in August 1972. The reasons given
for this failure are: (1) lack of multi-year funding; (2) improper
placement of
the program with the Office of Education; (3) changes in top
level administration,
both at the Office of Education and the D. C. Public
Schools; (4) change in
educational emphasis from community control to educational
accountabjlity;
(5) bureaucratic delay which Dr.
Strayer and Dr. Passow both recognized as
handicaps to new programs and which is also cited
as a compromising factor
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in the success of the Model School Division; (6) the lack of sophistication on
the part of the community in understanding the complexities of school and
government operations; and (7) lack of agreement among major participants on
priorities of goals for the Anacostia Project.
Certainly, the Anacostia Project did not fail because of lack of involvement
of any level of community or government. The Project was called for by the
President of the United States and had the support and backing of the Commissioner
of Education. It had the complete backing and support of the Superintendent
of Schools and the Board of Education. The program, without a doubt, was
planned completely with the active participation of the concerned citizens,
teachers, and youth of the community.
.
Conclusions and Observations
1. Involvement
In many recent attempts at educational reform, the major emphasis has
been upon the involvement of all the various groups of people concerned. In
the study of the five major plans for the District of Columbia this technique
ranged from complete involvement of virtually every group in the Anacostia
Project to a small involvement of outside experts in the Clark Plan, yet as has
been pointed out, the results are in each case rather similar. In
fact, one
could say that the Clark Plan has outlived the Anacostia Project, since
the
Anacostia Project is scheduled to be terminated in August 1972. Yet,
despite
the spasmodic involvement of all personnel, one has to
analyze what school
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officials were looking for in terms of change. Perhaps expectations of what
change efforts can accomplish have to be reevaluated. There are elements of
each of these projects still existent in the schools today and if this represents
change perhaps it is change in a small way which ultimately can be cultivated
into something that will have major impact upon the system.
2. Growth of the System
When Strayer made his Survey in 1948, the school population was roughly
90,000 pupils. In the beginning of school year 1973, it is projected that the
school population will approximate 143,000 pupils. This growth has been
accompanied by tremendous social upheaval in our cities, by massive influx
of federal monies, and by new demands for quicker delivery of services and
results to school clients - the children. Yet the administration has moved
0
farther and farther away from the children due to the very growth factors which
have increased the size and complexity of the organization of schools in big
cities. Those people who attempt to act as catalysts or change agents within
the school system often find that they lose focus on what they aie trying
to
change and find that they themselves become absorbed in the bureaucratic
structure of the school system. Many times they too begin to
focus in an almost
’’tunnel vision” manner.
3 . No Mechanism for the Introduction of Reform
Efforts in the Schools
The Innovation Team has been cited as an excellent
staff development
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effort. Yet there has been no attempt to replicate the kind of training and
effort that went into the development of the Innovation Team. This attempt at
change introduced into the Washington, D. C. School System from 1965 to
1970 provided time and again ample demonstration that there were accelerating
forces both within and without the school system which impeded action, paralyzed
decision making, made it impossible for the system to capitalize on its own
growth points and its new programs which had pointed ways to success. The
Innovation Team in particular was one example. It was one growth point in the
system with proven effectiveness. As stated earlier, it was impossible for 18
teachers to service the city and meet the .needs of all of the teachers that were
asking for help.
4. Lack of Continuous Funding
In the Anacostia Project, the Model School Division Project, and in the
carrying out of the recommendations of the Strayer Survey and the Passow Study,
a lack of continuous funding seriously compromised individual project success.
Each project director with whom the writer talked complained about the arrival
of funds in the middle of the school year, the uncertainty of the amount of
funding and the inability to plan for the following year based upon a given
amount of money. More money and a consistency in the flow of resources
is
not the answer to all of the schools' problems but it is one
important factor.
In a booklet prepared by the D. C. Citizens for Better
Public Education,
Washington does not seem to compare favorably financially
with other citjes.
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In cities of comparable size such as Atlanta, Baltimore, Boston, and
Cleveland, Washington, D. C. had the smallest share of the total city budget
spent on education. Atlanta spent 47.0 per cent of its total budget on education;
Baltimore 30.9 per cent; Boston 34.4 per cent, and Cleveland 33.2 per cent
in contrast to Washington, D. C. which spent 23. 9 per cent. In the neighboring
communities, Alexandria, Virginia spent 41.4 per cent of its budget on
education; Arlington, Virginia, 48. 8 per cent; Falls Church, Virginia, 52.9
per cent; Fairfax, Virginia 47.0 per cent; Montgomery County, Maryland 67. 9
per cent; Prince George’s County, Maryland, 59.5 per cent (See Table 1).
Yet more than money is needed. It will be remembered that both Dr.
Passow and Dr. Strayer pointed out that the problems that plagued the Model
School Division, the Anacostia Project and the Clark Plan, even with expanded
funding, would have to be corrected, i.e. , the business practices, the pro-
curement practices, the budget procedures and all of the life lines that service
the classroom would have to be updated and services improved so that supplies,
equipment, and materials reach the classroom when they were needed. The
parent, too, would have to understand the budget process, because an increase
in amounts for education would ultimately have to be borne by
the citizen - the
tax payer.
5. Impact
Each of the attempts to educational reform had some major impact on
the
piecemeal and bandaid operations, thcie
city. Despite the fact that they were
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Table I
Comparison of the Education Share of the Total Budget for
Washington, D. C.
,
Cities of Comparable Size and
Neighboring Communities, FY 1970
Cities of comparable size
to Washington, D. C.
Atlanta
Baltimore
Boston
Cleveland
Washington, D. C.
Education Share of
Total City Budget
47.0%
30. 9
34.4
33.2
23.9
Neighboring Communities
Alexandria, Va.
Arlington, Va.
Falls Church, Va.
Fairfax, Va.
Montgomery County, Md.
Prince George’s County, Md.
41.4
48. 8
52.9
47.0
67.9
59.5
Source: Statement by the President ot the District of
Columbia Board of
Education before the District of Columbia City Council,
on the
FY 1972 Budget. February 13, 1971
Financing the D.
Citizen. D. C.
C Public Schools: A Budgeting and Planning
Guide for the
Citzens for Better Public Education, Broad,
Ellicott, Malone
August 1971, p. 10.
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have been lingering effects; some positive, some negative in the school system.
It is hoped that what will emerge from these Programs is a marriage of the
best of the Clark Plan, the Model School Division, the Passow Study, the
Strayer Survey and the Anacostia Project to be put into a different form of
change effort. The system has only to create the models necessary to capitalize
on the best of the reform efforts that have taken place in the District of
Columbia since 1948.
There is little need for further studies by experts from outside the
system. In fact, I propose that a moratorium on such large scale efforts is
undoubtedly in order. In consideration of catalysts and change agents, it is
necessary to have a structure outside of the school system, completely
independent of the schools, but serving unique needs of the schools which only
such an organization is equipped to do. But a matching structure or compli-
mentary organization in the school system is necessary to utilize these services
to create an interfacing or constant flow of ideas, people, in and out of the two
organizations.
In 1968, the author submitted a Proposed Five-Year Plan for the Re-
organization of the Division of Instruction. The Plan was designed as the best
and most direct route for reaching the following ultimate goals: (1) raising
the achievement level of students in basic skills; (2) producing citizens capable
of satisfactory career fulfillment; (3) producing citizens adaptable to
a changing
society; and (4) maximizing the self-awareness and potential
fulfillment of each
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student. The Plan proposed that over a five-year period a series of
instructional units be established to provide training and assistance to the
classroom teachers and to guarantee that materials, supplies and new ideas
move systematically and continuously into the classroom. The Plan was the
outgrowth of four months of concentrated research, thought and discussion and
the work of a conference and a task force and should be viewed as a plan of
action and an outline of a strategy for involving the instructional units rather
than a detailed analysis of the final product. The instructional units would
serve discreet geographical areas to include one or more high schools and
feeder schools. They would serve only as service units; administrative and
operational control of the schools would remain the function of the assistant
superintendents in charge of the operation.
0
Prototype Instructional Unit
It was proposed in the plan that a prototype instructional unit be established
during this 1969-1970 school year. The unit would have been organized around
the concept of the team approach to the improvement of instruction;
therefore,
the related subject fields were to be clustered and supported by a core
of
generalists.
The prime goal must be the development of the teacher; the
curriculum to
be created, adopted and implemented must be broad and
relevant to today s
world. Teachers, representatives of neighborhoods,
and the community at
large must collaborate in shaping curriculum
in roles which provide real
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influence on linal decisions. The task of organizing to improve instruction
must be understood by all as a risk-taking enterprise bound to create confusion,
anxiety and some failures as a part of the process of working out more
successful relationship?.
This reorganization was designed to function inside the school system.
Another organization has been designed which would compliment the instructional
unit concept and would provide the outside dynamism for change in the District
Schools. This is the Advisory and Learning Exchange developed by Mary Lela
Sherburne, and established in September 1971, "to organize, connect and
facilitate learning and growth of individuals in the community of Washington,
D. C. relative to the process of education; the development of new institutions,
and the renewal of old ones.
Merging these two functions - utilizing grants from private foundations
to support the Advisory and Learning Exchange with school system funds being
contracted to the Advisory and Learning Exchange for those services that the
schools needed - provide the kind of organization capable of using the best of
the recommendations of the reform efforts discussed in this paper.
A number of decision making assumptions can be drawn from the
analysis of these attempts at educational reform within the D. C. Schools.
1. No plan for reform should be undertaken unless funding
is guaranteed for at least a four-to-five year period.
5Mary Lela Sherburne, "Advisory and Learning Exchange,
Theory of
Change and Influence on Which it Operates," August 1971.
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Any program which is to be implemented should from
its inception have realistic plans for continuous programs
assessment, and modification of program direction in
relationship to new findings. Example: The Anacostia
Project could not reshape itself and was evaluated against
different criteria than the original intent of the plan.
The Model School Division had to face the issue of larger
school system needs before there was ample opportunity
to prove it had increased the achievement scores of
children and improved the school environment or the
skills of school personnel within the Model School
Division. Strayer and Passow were replaced or forgotten
even before the reports were implemented since a lack of
resources dictated very limited capabilities or short-
term implementation plans. Thus, short-term plans
produce short-term interventions with very little potential
for long-term impact.
2. No plan should be adopted which was developed, introduced,
or imposed exclusively from outside the system that is
supposed to be changed. All plans should include an
appropriate planning period in which the stalf and personnel
slated to operate the program go through a process of
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accepting, rejecting, modifying and preparing themselves
to implement the plans.
3. No plan should be adopted which enables one part of a
system to be set aside from the larger system, unless
appropriate funds are added to the experimental funds, for
the specific purpose of dissemination and change within
the larger system. In other words, experimentation
should not only be allowed, it should be encouraged, but
only with constant interaction between the subsystem and
the larger system. Such constant interaction between the
two systems will broaden the impact of the reform itself
and will also prevent exclusivity and jealousy from de-
veloping among personnel. By its success, the Innovation
Team created jealousy of extra services that were provided
for one section of the city to the apparent exclusion of the
rest of the school system.
4. Any new educational reform plan should undertake a
testing and systems analysis process which would determine
how the proposed plan interfered with, challenged or
eradicated already existing operational guidelines,
regulations or rules under which the system was currently
operating. For example, the Clark Plan negated
some of the
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underlying concepts and principals upon which the Model
School Division was based and also violated the Board-
Washington Teachers' Union Contract.
5. No plan should be adopted unless it recognized that success-
ful growth of personnel and of students, as well as increased
learning opportunities would of necessity require some basic
and meaningful change within the system itself. For example,
Innovation Team members could not remain in the system
because successful strategies of peer operation did not fit
with the system's expectancy of "promotion" and supervisory
bureaucratic hierarchy. The system could not provide the
personal challenge and satisfactions to support the individual
professional growth it had encouraged.
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appendix
The Five-Year Plan for Improving Instructional Services in
The Division of Instruction
This plan proposes that over the next five years a series of Instructional
Units be established to provide training and assistance to the classroom teacher
and to guarantee that materials supplies and new ideas move systemtatically
and continuously into the classroom. The plan is the outgrowth of four months
of concentrated research, thought and discussion and the work of a conference
and a Task Force. It should be viewed as a plan of action and an outline of the
strategy for evolving the Instructional Units rather than a detailed analysis of
the final product.
This plan was designed as the best and most direct route for reaching
the. following ultimate goals
:
- Raising the achievement level of students in basic skills;
- Producing citizens capable of satisfactory career fulfillment;
- Producing citizens adaptable to a changing society;
— Maximizing self-awareness and the potential fulfillment of
each student.
The Instructional Units will serve discrete geographical areas to
include
one or more high schools and feeder schools. They will
serve only as service
units. Administrative and operational control of the
schools will remain the
function of the Assistant Superintendents in charge
of operations.
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The Instructional Units will report directly to the Deputy Superintendent
through the Associate Superintendent for Instructional Services. In addition
to the line personnel reporting to the Deputy Superintendent, the following staff
service groups will be available: State Level Directors, who will be the
present heads of subject matter departments and will provide leadership in their
particular areas of expertise; Office of the Director of Staff Development, which
will provide leadership for Staff Development Teams in the Instructional Units;
and Executive Staff, which will provide research and logistic support.
Prototype Instructional Unit
It is proposed that a prototype Instructional Unit be established during
the 1969-70 school year. The Unit will be organized around the concept of the
teaiji approach to the improvement of instruction; therefore, the related
subject fields will be clustered and supported by a core of generalists.
The prime goal must be the development of the teacher. The cun iculum
to be adopted, created and implemented must be broadly relevant to today s
world. Teachers, representatives of neighborhoods and the community at
large
must collaborate in shaping curriculum in roles which provide real
influence
on final decision. The task of organizing to improve instruction
must be
understood by all as a risk-taking enterprise bound to create
confusion,
anxiety and some failures as a part of the process of working
out more successful
patterns of relationships.
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The prototype Unit must be housed in a facility geographically related to
the schools served and must provide adequate space for the activities to be
carried out by the Unit. Sixty-five professional and ten non-professional
positions will be redeployed to the Unit.
The central officer of the Unit will be a Director who will coordinate and
bring into focus the support teams and the expressed needs of principals,
community and teachers. An Advisory Committee, comprised of two teachers,
two parents, two principals and the leaders of the four permanent teams within
the Unit, will be a decision making group and will meet on a regular basis with
the Director to review operations and recommendations. A Business Manager
will be in charge of budgeting, finance, purchasing, management of the building,
securing and scheduling substitutes for staff development. There will be four
permanent teams within the Unit. Each team will have permanent members and
will also draw from Specialists working in the center as needed. While their
precise functioning must be determined by the first Unit, these teams will
provide services to the classroom and support to the teacher, conduct work-
shops, provide assistance in improving teaching and classroom
management
and implement new instructional materials. Specialists will be
primarily
responsible for subject matter. Task forces will be temporary work
groups
assembled to do specific tasks - writing curriculum, studying
new materials
or finding answers to specific problems.
Evaluation services will be provided by the Division
of Long Range
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Planning, Innovation and Research, to be facilitated by addition to the executive
staff of a Coordinator for Evaluation. The internal evaluation made by the
school staff which formulates goals and objectives should also be used, and
outside agencies should be engaged to provide summative and comparative
evaluation.
Implementation
The implementation of the Instructional Unit has been divided into four
growth phases for purposes of planning, budgeting and training staff. Growth
must be regarded as evolutionary and developmental within each individual Unit,
as well as within the city as a whole.
Phase I is the planning and development stage for each Unit and should be
carried out as a small group operation. During this period, personnel will be
deployed from subject departments; a teacher will be detailed from each
building; a program budget will be established; new positions will be created and
budget submitted for new costs; training and staff development will be designed
and temporary leadership will be appointed to serve during the organization
and
training period.
Phase II is the organization of the Unit, the first stages of operation
and
implementation of a delimited program in given areas of curriculum
and staff
development. During this stage, the staff will establish its own
physical
facilities, work on its own personal development and
organization, set up
initial programs with the schools, operate workshops
and support plans for the
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school with a gradual ascending magnitude of services and effort.
Phase III will be expanding the operation of this Unit, but will include
making curriculum development research operative at the Unit level. One area
of interest will have been chosen and plans laid, as well as budget needs
established for intensive curriculum work and development within the Unit,
which will utilize the efforts of teachers and resources of outside consultants
and specialists.
Phase IV is the final stage, regarded as being one of full operation with
evaluation, classroom support, staff development and curriculum development
being attached for each area on a local basis.
These four phases can be developed in all eleven areas of the city by
the end of a five-year period. The timetable is shown in Chart 4, page 27 of
0
the Plan.
Considerations in Establishing Instructional Units 1969-70
1. Timing. The recommendation of all concerned is that
immediate planning and staff development get underway.
2. Location of Physical Space. An Instructional Planning
and Service Center will be established ns the base of
operations for the training, developing and deploying of
all these Units. It is recommended that this Center be
established in the Malcolm Scates Building at 13th and
Upshur Streets, N.W. because of its availability and
desirability for these purposes.
3. Establishment of the First Unit. The
Task Force le
commended the Spingarn area for establishment of the
first Unit as it has a large population of
pupils and
teachers and has not had input from special
programs.
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Other areas which fall into this category are the
Dunbar area and the Roosevelt area. An arbitrary
choice will have to be made for the first Unit,
although inherent in the development of the first is
the promise that all will ultimately be reached.
4. Logistics of Setting up the Unit. If this plan is
adopted the following steps will be taken:
Step 1 Involve principals in the schools in the area
in a briefing session opening the way for their
participation.
Step 2 Provide a briefing session for teachers from
each building and discuss their needs in the
classroom.
Step 3 Obtain a similar assessment of needs through
community representatives.
Step 4 Deploy personnel from departments to this Unit.
Step 5 Principals and representatives of the Washington
Teachers Union will assign one teacher from each
building to be the teacher member of the team.
Step 6 Establishment of program budget enabling the
Unit to be dealt with as a whole.
Step 7 Deputy Superintendent, with the approval of the
Superintendent, will appoint a temporary director
and committee to assist in initial organization.
Training and Development of the Staff of the Instructional Unit
One of the first tasks of the Unit will be the provision of staff development
for itself. Adequate provisions must be made to have the assistance, guidance,
consultation and services of outside organizations and individuals in hammeiing
out the new organization. The first sessions should provide the following:
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task-oriented planning sessions and human relations training for all members;
modification of job assignments and task analysis as operation gets underway;
and focus on major area of curriculum. Reading and language arts along with
Black historical and social experience are recommended.
Once the training and planning is complete and the first Unit moves into
Phase II, it will be appropriate to proceed to establishing Phase I operations
for two additional Units. This Phase I operation should consist of ten members
from the two next Units to be set up. They will be representative of admini-
stration, teachers, principals, specialists and services. They will be released
some part of their time to work in the building with the Operational Instructional
Staff. Part of their training and planning will consist of observation of the first
Unit as it establishes itself.
Estimated costs for establishment of the Instruction Unit prototype for
one full year are shown in Chart 5, page 36 of the Plan. Chart 6, page ^7,
projects the costs for phasing in the Plan over the five-year period.
Note; A complete copy of the Plan is available through the D.
C. Public
Schools, 415 Twelfth Street, N. E. , Washington, D. C. ,
20005.


